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Preface
Since 9/11, India has played significant role in the process of reconstructing
Afghanistan. The projects and assistance of India covers all the important sectors in
this war torn nation ranging from basic amenities to the construction of power
transmission lines. With the perception to stabilize Afghanistan and bring peace,
India’s focus is to establish democratic tradition, enhance economic development,
build Afghan capacity and raise the living standard of Afghan people. India also
wants to re-build that country as a transit route for trade and energy supplies between
the regions adjacent. The country is also significant for India’s ‘Connect Central Asia
Policy’ to meet her energy requirements. However, there are some challenges for
India in pursuing her Afghan policy. For instance, lack of direct transit, Indo-Pak
rivalry & Pakistan factor in Indo-Afghan relations, US-Iran rift & its effect on India’s
Afghan policy etc. The challenges have become more complex with the re-emergence
of Taliban, Pakistan’s comeback in Afghan affairs, the United States decision of
troop’s drawdown by 2014 and the process of Taliban reconciliation.
The analysts of India’s Afghan Policy have raised various queries vis-à-vis the
changing power equations and circumstances in the region. Since the United States
announcement of troop’s drawdown from Afghanistan under the circumstances when
Taliban resurgence is at peaks, the queries regarding India’s Afghan strategy include -
Is Afghanistan again out of the reach of India? Are the objectives of India’s Afghan
Policy achievable? What measures are suitable for India’s Foreign Policy in general
and Afghan Policy in particular to deal with the re-emergence of Taliban and growing
influence of Pakistan in Afghan politics? What should be the approach, response and
strategy of India to deal post-2014 Afghanistan? At what costs could India afford to
maintain her presence in Afghanistan? In this regard, the study attempts to meet all
such queries while focusing various dimensions of India’s engagements with
Afghanistan since 9/11. Apart from this, the study also provides comprehensive
suggestions to guide India’s Afghan policy in post-2014 Afghanistan.
I am highly thankful to my worthy supervisor Dr. Tabasum Firdous for her prominent
guidance. Her inspiration and support make me able to complete this research
proposal with high comfort. During the process, I met some health ailments that
vsometimes make me feel impossible to complete the task. However, the moral support
and motherly treatment of my supervisor always encouraged me, and only then, I
have completed the assigned research proposal. I also wish to thank Prof. Ajaz A.
Bandey, Director of Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir, for his
valuable assistance, suggestions and problem-solving attitude while formulating and
compiling this dissertation. I am also thankful to Prof. G. M. Mir, Director of Area
Studies, CCAS, Prof. Mustaq A. Kaw and Prof. G. N. Khaki for the guidance,
suggestions and friendly attitude towards me during the process. I am thankful to the
teaching faculty and non- teaching members of the Centre for their considerable help
in my favour. My sincere thanks also goes to the librarians and other official workers
of University of Kashmir, CCAS, IDSA, Teen Murti Bawan, India International
Centre, Afghan Embassy, American Library, Delhi University, Jamia Millia Islamia
and Jawaharlal Nehru University for their assistance in locating relevant research
material. I am sincerely thankful to the Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of
India, for providing the official documents, other required material and up-to-date
information regarding India’s engagements with Afghanistan. I also owe boundless
gratitude to my family and friends for providing the valuable support.
University of Kashmir, Srinagar Ashfaq Maqsood Ali
March 2013
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Chapter – 1 Introduction
1
1.1 India’s Geo-Strategic Profile and Changing Foreign Policy
India is the seventh largest country in geographical terms, second populous and
largest democracy in the world.1 India shares her border with Pakistan to the west,
Bhutan, China & Nepal to the northeast and Bangladesh & Myanmar to the east.
Besides it, the Indian Ocean on the south, the Arabian Sea on the southwest and the
Bay of Bengal on the southeast also covers her. The country is also in vicinity of Sri
Lanka and Maldives in the Indian Ocean. The Andaman & Nicobar islands of India
share a maritime border with Thailand and Indonesia.2 In terms of her population,
size, economic development, technological advancement and military capabilities,
India has a predominant position in South Asia,3 and accounts for 76% of the
population of South Asia living in 73.25% of the total land area of the region.4
Since the last decade of the twentieth century, the broadening concept of security
from traditional to non-traditional threats including religious extremism, international
terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and aggressive nationalism has led the
nation-states to alter their foreign policies. India also reoriented her foreign policy for
the non-traditional security threats are present in her immediate and extended
neighbourhood.5 The country is eagerly cooperating with the regional and global
initiatives to face these non-conventional threats,6 and is now poised to emerge as one
of the world’s largest economies. Since last two decades, India has attempted new
endeavours in her foreign policy in the quest for attaining the status of a global
power.7 The transition within the internal and external determinants of her Foreign
Policy has changed her vision of the world. Post-Cold war era witnessed India
reformulating her foreign policy while following the major determinants as economic
1 Anjan Roy, Amit Kumar, “India Takes Lead to Cope with Challenges in Neighbourhood”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.749
2 Anjan Roy, Amit Kumar, “India Takes Lead to Cope with Challenges in Neighbourhood”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.749
3 Arunoday Bajpai, “India’s Economic Diplomacy in South Asia”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No.
11- 12, November-December 2011, p.742
4 Latha A. Pandit, “India and Her Neighbours: Changing Perceptions”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII,
No. 06, June 2011, p.339
5 Nirmala Joshi, “India, Central Asia and Afghanistan: Security and Economic Dimensions”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.551
6 R.S. Yadav, “India’s Foreign Policy: Paradigm Shift in the Post-Cold War Era”, World Focus,
Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.732
7 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities: Economy Emerges as the Driving
Force”, World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.503
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growth, energy security, nuclear capability, democratic tradition and soft-power
capability.8 Today, the driving forces of her foreign policy are the need for sustained
economic growth, energy & maritime security, access to technology & innovation,
internal & external security.9 Thus, the prominence of geo-economic factors led to
fundamental reorientation of her world vision. The country adopted new outlooks and
orientations in her economic dealings with the rest of the world. Besides this new
outlook, some compulsions encouraged her to relook the basic postulates of foreign
policy. These include the financial crises of early 1990s followed by the adoption of
the LPG-model of economic growth, the disintegration of the second world and the
shock therapy applied to the newly independent republics of the erstwhile USSR,
initiation of the process of globalization and adoption of the Capitalist model of
development in most parts of the world. Thus, the end of Cold War, transnational
terrorism, globalization of various economies and revolution in information
technology changed the global order and necessitated paradigmatic shift in India’s
Foreign Policy.10 Besides it, the predominance of geo-economics over geo-politics,
non-conventional threats over the conventional threats, comprehensive security over
the traditional notion of security and the acquisition of nuclear status by India also led
to fundamental reorientation in her foreign policy.11
India is facing both the conventional and new challenges in South Asia. The
conventional challenges are active in the form of ‘Big Brother’ syndrome, Indo-Pak
rivalry, lack of regional economic integration, persistent instability and conflicts
among the regional countries etc. The new challenges are securing grounds in the
form of China’s involvement in the region, widening developmental gap between
India and other South Asia nations, and lack of effective integration of South Asian
countries with the global economy.12 The current developments and shifts at global
8 Mohammed Badrul Alam, “Basic Parameters of India’s Foreign Policy and its Resilience”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.739
9 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities: Economy Emerges as the Driving
Force”, World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.503
10 Mohammed Badrul Alam, “Basic Parameters of India’s Foreign Policy and its Resilience”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.739
11 R.S. Yadav, “India’s Foreign Policy: Paradigm Shift in the Post-Cold War Era”, World Focus,
Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.731
12 Arunoday Bajpai, “India’s Economic Diplomacy in South Asia”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No.
11- 12, November-December 2011, p.747
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order suggest that the country has to work for creating the external environment
conducive to her transformation and development. For this, India has to care and
address the three sets of challenges i.e. ensuring a peaceful neighbourhood,
establishing and balancing the relations with the major powers, and addressing the
issues of food security, water, energy and environment.13 It is in this context that
India’s foreign policy since early 21st century added an intermediating level between
the regions and global outlook. The country is pursuing policies to restore her ties and
reintegrate with adjacent regions.14 Acknowledging the significance of the regional
economic cooperation, the country has engaged the regional countries in the
framework of ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘extended neighbourhood’ policy. India sought
the cooperation of her immediate neighbours while supporting the cause of South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) that includes, besides India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and Afghanistan. Her
framework of extended neighbourhood stretches from the Suez Canal to the South
China Sea including West Asia, Central Asia Republics, Southeast Asia, East Asia,
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Rim.15 This ‘extended neighbourhood’ policy first
engaged the Southeast Asian nations under the “Look-East Policy” framework and
now the Central Asian Republics under the policy framework of “Connect Central
Asia Policy” (CCAP). Thus, the ‘Look East Policy’ since 1990s and now the
‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ since the beginning of the 21st century reflects India’s
‘Extended Neighbourhood’ orientations.
With the involvement of world powers in South Asia, particularly the US and China,
the strategic interests of India has increased manifold. Her major foreign policy
objectives in South Asia are to ensure peace, stability and development in the region,
promote regional economic integration and secure her strategic & economic
interests.16 In order to sustain her economic growth the country has to ensure adequate
supplies of energy resources and raw materials. For this, the country has
13 Mohammed Badrul Alam, “Basic Parameters of India’s Foreign Policy and its Resilience”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.740
14 Vinod Anand, “Multi-Directional Policies of Central Asian Nations and India”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.450
15 R.S. Yadav, “Changing Contours of India’s Neighbourhood Policy”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII,
No. 06, June 2011, p.338
16 Arunoday Bajpai, “India’s Economic Diplomacy in South Asia”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No.
11- 12, November-December 2011, p.742
Chapter – 1 Introduction
4
acknowledged the need to promote regional economic integration. However, her
primary aspiration of socio-economic development, security and peace is dependent
on a peaceful and prosperous neighbourhood. All this necessitates the policy designs
to provide a space for the political, economic and cultural links with all her
neighbours.17 Besides it, the country has to deal both her core and peripheral
neighbourhood in different manner while taking into account the regional diversities
due to geo-strategic and geo-political nature.18 Taking into consideration these
necessities and requirements for regional integration, Afghanistan provides a suitable
route for India to achieve her objectives. Besides the geo-strategic significance,
Afghanistan is also essential to contain the non-traditional security threats within the
region. Thus, India’s ‘Afghan Policy’ since 9/11 forms an essential part of her
neighbourhood and extended neighbourhood orientations.
1.2 Afghanistan’s Geo-Strategic Profile in a Historical Context
Afghanistan is a landlocked country that covers an area of 647,497 sq km, stretches
1300 km from the southwest to northeast with a width of about 600 km.19 Her
significance lies with the location as a crossway between the Indian subcontinent to
the southeast, Central Asian Steppes to the north and the Iranian Plateau in the west.20
The adjacent countries having direct boundary linkage with her include Pakistan
(2,430 km), Iran (936 km), Turkmenistan (744 km), Uzbekistan (137 km), Tajikistan
(I,206 km), and China (76 km).21 The proximity to Iran on the west, Pakistan on the
south & east, and Central Asian Republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan on the north and China in the northeast justifies her strategic location.22 The
geo-strategic position of the country between the three regions led the scholars to call
17 Mohammed Badrul Alam, “Basic Parameters of India’s Foreign Policy and its Resilience”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.740
18 R.S. Yadav, “Changing Contours of India’s Neighbourhood Policy”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII,
No. 06, June 2011, p.338
19 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Taliban and the Great Game in Afghanistan, Vanguard Books Ltd, 1999, p.16
20 Obaid Younossi, Khalid Nadiri, “Afghanistan at the Crossroads”, cited in Afghanistan: State and
Society, Great Power Politics and the Way Ahead, findings from an International Conference,
Copenhagen Denmark, 2007, accessible at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/confproceeding/2008/rand-
CF238.pdf, (accessed on November 04, 2010, at 22:27)
21 The World Fact Book – Afghanistan, accessible at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/af.html, (accessed on November
24, 2010, at 21:47)
22 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.412
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her ‘a region at the cross roads of history’.23 Afghanistan, as positioned between
South, Central and West Asia has always been a cause of interest for big powers.24 As
Dr. Mondira Dutta put it, the geo-centric position of Afghanistan at the crossroads of
Asia implies that “a measure of control over Afghanistan will automatically lead to a
measure of control over South Asia, Iran and the resource rich regions of Central
Asia”.25 Historically, the country has witnessed foreign interventions and perpetual
instability. Since her inception in 1747, the country has remained the subject of direct
influence of both inter-regional and extra-regional powers.26 Foreign interference has
remained a constant feature in the form of ‘The Great Game’, the Soviet invasion and
the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. First, during the period of British
imperialism, the country witnessed many wars including three Anglo-Afghan wars.
The political and economic compulsions of the imperialist British and Czarist Russia
led them to create Afghanistan as a buffer state between the territories under their
rule. After a relatively peaceful period from 1919 to 1978, the country witnessed civil
wars and foreign interventions since late 1970s. In December 1979, large number of
Soviet troops landed in Kabul and seized all-important installations. However, the
regimes installed by the Soviets were not in a capacity to rule outside the Kabul
because of the resistance of Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet occupation. Since
1984, the Mujahideen of Afghanistan received financial assistance and other support
particularly from the United States and Pakistan.27 Pakistan, under the influence of the
USA, played vital role while encouraging the Afghan resistance and subsequent war
against the Soviets. The Soviet occupation resulted in the emergence of Warlords and
religious fundamentalism in Afghanistan.28 However, the USSR under the leadership
of Mikhail Gorbachev while realizing the complex nature of war and Afghan, agreed
23 Barnett R. Rubin, The Search for Peace on Afghanistan: From Buffer State to a Failed State, Yale
University Press, 1995, pp.138-139
24 Nabiha Gul, Post-9/11 Afghanistan and the Regional Security Scenario, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 59,
No. 1, January 2006, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, p.57
25 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.412
26 Haraun Mir, “Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C.,
2010, p.7
27 Alex Alexiev, “The War in Afghanistan: Soviet Strategy and the State of Resistance”, accessible
at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/rand-CF7038.pdf, (accessed on November 21, 2010,
at 22:06)
28 Graham E Fuller, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan: Its Character and Prospects”
accessible at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2008/rand-CF3970.pdf, (accessed on December
02, 2010, at 20:56)
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to withdraw forces from that country.29 However, the Soviet withdrawal without any
proper arrangement of governance system created power vacuum in Kabul that led to
the brutal civil war. During this civil war, the Pashtun Mujahideen (Taliban) educated
in the Madrassas of Pakistan started a movement to resist anarchy in Afghanistan.30
The Taliban emerged out of the civil war and established government at Kabul in
1996. They gradually capture 90% of the country by the end of 1998.31 Afghanistan
during 1992-2001 also became a ground for a proxy war between Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia on one side, and Iran, India, and Russia on the other.32
In the post-Cold war era, the independence of the Central Asian Republics (CARs)
and the discovery of significant mineral resources in Central Asia changed the geo-
strategic equation in the region. The CARs hold the potential key to meet 21st century
energy requirements of the world. Afghanistan sharing direct boundary links with the
three CARs and her position at the cross roads of three strategic regions again
acquired critical importance as a land bridge for oil & natural gas pipelines and trade
route. However, foreign interventions and wars devastated the country and bred
extremist elements. This added further insecurity to the countries and the regions
adjacent to her. The strategic interests of the great powers in that country against the
threat of terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking is enough to prove her
potential to effect the countries beyond her border. Today, Afghanistan and the
regions adjacent to her involve the main security threats of the world community in
21st century. The event of 9/11 provided an opportunity for the United States to
intervene with a view to cope the threat of terrorism. Thus, the US led coalition forces
waged a war in that country under ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. Since 2001, the
consensus of the international community to fight and defeat international terrorism
renewed hope for the country.33 International community mainly focused the
29 Geneva Accord accessible at:
http://www.institute-forafghanstudies.org/Accords%20Treaties/geneva_accords_1988_pakistan_
afghanistan.htm, (accessed on December 02, 2010, at 20:33)
30 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994 – 1997, Oxford University Press,
1999, pp.20-24
31 Abdul Sattar, “Afghanistan: Past, Present and Future, From Jihad to Civil War”, The Institute of
Regional Studies, Islamabad, 1997, pp.462-463
32 Haraun Mir, “Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C.,
2010, p.7
33 Nabiha Gul, Post-9/11 Afghanistan and the Regional Security Scenario, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 59,
No. 1, January 2006, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, p.45
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stabilization of the governance system in this country.34 With the overthrow of
Taliban regime and the establishment of a new government under the Bonn
Agreement of 05th of December 2001, the international community began a long-term
commitment of rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure and economy.35 The decision
on the meeting of the Loya Jirga (The Grand Council) proved one of the significant
moves of the Bonn Agreement as the Loya Jirga met after 23 years on 12th of June
2002.36 After unveiling the Constitution for public comments on 04th of November
2003, the Loya Jirga approved the same in January 2004.37 Afghanistan is now on the
track of democracy. Her geo-strategic location holds significance for intra-regional,
inter-regional as well as extra-regional states for trade, transit and energy supplies.
The objectives of the Afghan government is to achieve internal stability, maintain
cordial relations with the neighbours and other regional players, and act as a trade and
transit route linking South and Central Asia as well as China with Iran and the rest of
the Middle East.38
The fall of the Taliban government activated various powers to seek and promote
their economic and political advantage in Afghanistan.39 Geographically, the country
has a strategic position to become a trade and business hub between the three strategic
regions as well as China.40 The concept of ‘Greater Central Asia’ is a vision of
treating both the Central and South Asia as one integrated unit for enhancing the
economic growth and prosperity.41 The countries of both the regions have common
concerns of exploring the sources for energy supplies, achieving peace and prosperity
through economic cooperation and enhancing security & stability. Afghanistan is a
land bridge connecting the Central Asian Republics with the huge markets of South
34 Jessica T. Mathews, “Through Their Eyes: Possibilities for a Regional Approach to Afghanistan”,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C., No. 20036, 2010
35 “Afghanistan’s Other Neighbours: Iran, Central Asia, and China”, Istanbul Conference Report,
Turkey, February 2009, p.12
36
Shameem Akhtar, “Lоуа Jirga Paves the Way”, The Dawn, 20 June 2002
37 Jessica T. Mathews, “Through Their Eyes: Possibilities for a Regional Approach to Afghanistan”,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C., No. 20036, 2010
38 Haraun Mir, “Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C.,
No.20036, 2010, p.8
39 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.412
40 Andrew C. Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson, David A. Gordon, “Afghanistan: Building the
Missing Link in the Modern Silk Road”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2010, p.34
41 Vinod Anand, “Multi-Directional Policies of Central Asian Nations and India”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December, 2008, p.449
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Asia. Her location is enough to say that the future prospects for increased economic
cooperation are brighter. The country possesses huge mineral deposits estimated at
US $ 3 trillion.42 Her mineral and hydrocarbon resources, agriculture and human
resource potential, and geographical location could pave the way to move her from an
aid-dependent to self-reliant economy.43 However, the continuous instability in that
country after a decade long presence of international forces, the resurgence of the
Taliban since last few years and the US decision of troop’s drawdown at this crucial
stage has raised concerns about the future of the country as well as the security of the
adjacent countries. The war torn nation is not in a capacity to hold full responsibility
for her security, governance and development. The existing situation within the
country is not favourable for regional peace and security in the near future. The
country is still suffering from serious instability. Air strikes, bomb blasts, hunt for al
Qaeda & Taliban elements, suicide attacks, kidnappings and killings have spoiled the
developmental process.44 Thus, the US decision of NATO exit has raised concerns for
the international community and the regional countries.
Besides altering the state set-up in Afghanistan, the US-led war in 2001 also gave a
new dimension to regional politics, peace and security. The activities of the
international community in the post-9/11 phase “made Afghanistan alive in the global
scenario, especially amongst Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China, United States and India as
well”.45 The common realization is that the country’s security, stability and prosperity
in military, political and economic spheres respectively depend on strengthening her
ties with the neighbours. Afghanistan, perceived as gateway to the energy-rich Central
Asia, holds strategic importance for India.46 In the Post-9/11 era, India intensified the
efforts to re-establish her influence in that country. The relations between the two
nations have moved from the tradition of historical and cultural ties to the
42 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.774
43 “Afghanistan’s Other Neighbours: Iran, Central Asia, and China”, Istanbul Conference Report,
Turkey, February 2009, p.3
44 Nabiha Gul, Post-9/11 Afghanistan and the Regional Security Scenario, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 59,
No. 1, January 2006, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, p.46
45 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.412
46 Tridib Chakraborti, “India’s Relations with South Asia in 2010: A Journey of Crests and Troughs”,
World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.516
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development partnerships.47 As expressed by India’s former Foreign Secretary
Nirupama Rao, “India is engaged in developmental and humanitarian work to assist the
Afghan people as they build a peaceful, stable, inclusive, democratic and pluralistic
Afghanistan….”48 India has contributed to the reconstruction of this country in all
sectors and has pledged the assistance worth US $ 2 billion to rebuild the war torn
nation. India’s geo-strategic interests require a peaceful, stable, democratic and
friendly Afghanistan. However, the challenges in this war torn country have become
more complex with the re-emergence of Taliban and the return of Pakistan factor in
Afghan politics. The worries have increased with the US-led NATO troops preparing
to withdraw. The ongoing debate among the policy makers is that what should be and
how to design ‘India’s Post-2014 Afghan Policy’.49 In this regard, the study focuses
Indo-Afghan relations in a historical context to analyse various dimensions to sort out
a solution for India’s future options in Afghanistan.
1.3 Methodology
The study refers to a number of interrelated topics and questions as its objectives
involved the scrutiny of geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan, historical
perspective of Indo-Afghan relations with a focus on developments since 9/11, the
opportunities, interests and challenges for India with a special focus on Pakistan
factor. Thus, as per the requirements of the study both qualitative and quantitative
methods found a significant space. The bulk of study based on the analysis of
documents, books, journals, periodicals and scholarly papers, both online and offline
substantiates that secondary sources form the very base with the support of accessible
primary data in the form of official documents and statements. The textual
interpretation or content analysis employed as a research tool substantiates the
objectivity and subjectivity of the methodology to complete the task. The study has
addressed the research questions and objectives in four chapters to reach the
conclusion and map out valuable suggestions.
47 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.778
48 “Reaching Out to Afghanistan”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, April 10,
2011, p.2, accessible at: www.mea.gov.in, accessed on November 21, 2012, at 22:17
49 Vishal Chandra, “Growing Afghan Uncertainty and India’s Options”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII,
No. 06, June 2011, p.379
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1.4 Review of Literature
The competence of the study lies with revisiting a bulk of literature available in the
form of books, articles, journals, magazines etc. A description of few books and
research papers consulted is as following:
The Anatomy of a Conflict: Afghanistan & 9/11, (ed.), by Anand Giridharadas, Ajai
Shukla, Rahimullah Yusufzai, John Jennings, Dr. Rifaat Hussain, J. N. Dixit & Julie
Sirris, The Lotus Collection, New Delhi, 2002
The book covers the wide dimensions of Afghan problem and its consequences for the
whole region. The authors also discuss the role of international community to address
the problems in Afghanistan. It deals the civil war and Taliban rule in Afghanistan
during 1990s. It also provides a significant account of the foreign policies of
neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, towards Afghanistan. The book also
highlights the obstacles on the way to address Afghan problem. J.N. Dixit’s paper
entitled “The Political and Economic Reconstruction of Afghanistan” in this book has
explored the role of external factors, including India, in rebuilding Afghanistan. Dr.
Rifaat Husain’s paper under the title “Pakistan’s Afghan Policy” highlights India as
the main motivating force behind Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan. The paper
also points out the intention of Pakistan to engage Afghanistan against India’s
interests. However, the process of reconstructing Afghanistan and India’s exertion in
it deserves a coherent and encyclopaedic examination. There is also the requirement
to explore in a systematic way the attempts of Pakistan in underestimating India’s
influence in Afghanistan. There is also the need to examine India’s response to such
activities of Pakistan that forms the crux of this study.
The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Kashmir, Afghanistan and Internal Security
Threats (1947-2004), by Musa Khan Jalalzi, Ariana Publications, Lahore, 2003
Providing an overview of the foreign policy of Pakistan, the book has focused the
simultaneous influence of state and religion on it. After a deep analysis of the foreign
policy of Pakistan, the book specifically focuses her Afghan policy, particularly since
the General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime. Highlighting the role of Pakistan in Afghan affairs
under the influence and guidance of the US, it deals with the negative repercussions
of all this on the state of Pakistan. It also provides a significant deliberation on the
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policy of Pakistan vis-à-vis India. It gives an insight to the cross-border terrorism
while focusing the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. It also deals with the
militant groups and their stand in Pakistan’s foreign policy as Harkatul Mujahideen
(HM) & Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT). The post-Cold war and the nuclear status of Pakistan
also found an important space in this book. Touching this aspect, the book highlights
the role of Pakistan towards India and Afghanistan. The book focuses the interests of
Pakistan to use Afghanistan as her backyard and influence the policies of Taliban
regime. However, it does not deal the nature of Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis India and
her presence in Afghanistan since 9/11. Thus, it lacks the main aspect of Indo-Pak
rivalry since 9/11 and Pakistan’s perception and response to the involvement of India
in Afghanistan.
The Afghan War and its Geopolitical Implications for India, (ed.), by Salman
Haider, Manohar Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi, 2004
The book highlights the nature of Afghan problem and the struggle for building the
nation of Afghanistan. It also focuses the policy of the United States towards
Afghanistan and the response of regional countries to the US presence in Afghanistan.
It analyses deeply the impact of the US involvement on the social, political and
economic aspects of the region. The book highlights the common concerns of India
and the US that led them to enhance their relations. It also provides a detailed
description of the opportunities and role for India in the changed circumstances since
the event of 9/11 and the US involvement in the region. It provides a significant
account of the interests of India in Afghanistan as well as in the whole region. The
book is worth of acknowledgment in putting forth the challenges for India remaining
engaged with Afghanistan. However, the developments and changes since the
resurgence of Taliban deserve a factual analysis to examine India’s new and growing
challenges.
The New Afghanistan: Pawn of America?, by Major General Samay Ram, Manas
Publications, New Delhi, 2004
The book has focused the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan. It also dealt the
nature of Afghan conflict in its historical context. It presents the ideology and
highlights the role of some important nation-states in the rise of Taliban. It touches
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the various dimensions of US-led war under the ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. It
also discusses the role of International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan
since their inception. It gives an insight of the government and administration in
Afghanistan since 9/11. It also highlights the consequences of Afghan war on
Pakistan. Besides it, the book provides a significant account of the involvement of
India in Afghanistan as well as her response to the terrorism since 9/11. The book has
also focused the potential of Taliban as well as their resurgence. However, Pakistan’s
comeback in Afghan politics has again changed the circumstances and it becomes
necessary to analyse the challenges for India posed by the resurgence of Taliban and
Pakistan’s strategic designs as a response to it.
Afghanistan: Dynamics of Survival, by Jagmohan Meher, Kalpaz Publications,
Delhi, 2008
The book deals with Afghanistan in a historical perspective while focusing the
interests of external powers in this country since her inception. It provides an insight
into the British-Russian rivalry and ‘The Great Game’. It also focuses the three
Anglo-Afghan Wars and the interests behind them. It touches the modern state of
nature in Afghanistan. While describing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it
highlights the role of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. It deals with the
civil war during 1990s and the rise of Taliban as its product. The book, while
analysing the post-9/11 situation in Afghanistan, highlights the consequences of the
US intervention in South & Central Asia. It also provides a significant account of the
stakes of India in Afghanistan and in the whole region. However, the book has not
dealt the new issues and challenges in Afghanistan that has severe consequences for
the whole region. It also falls short of the new undercurrents for India in her
involvement in Afghanistan. It has not focused the challenges for the region in general
and India in particular with the strong comeback of Taliban.
Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Central Asia, by Ahmed Rashid, Penguin Books, New York, 2009
The book highlights the significance of Central & South Asia and the interests of
world nations in this region, particularly after the end of Cold war. It describes the
region as the most volatile because of its strategic position and wealth. It also
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highlights the situation of this region since last twenty years. It significantly focuses
the recent state of nature in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It described Taliban as the
product of direct consequence of the activities of warlords. Describing the agenda of
Taliban as to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend
Islam in Afghanistan, the book highlights their definition of Sharia influenced by
extremism that led them to come under the jihad philosophy of al Qaeda. The book
provides an insight to the nexus between Islamic extremists and Pakistan army
because of the Kashmir issue. It also held the Pakistan Army responsible for
encouraging the youngsters of Pakistan to fight in the insurgency movement in
Kashmir. However, the book falls short in highlighting the core issue of India’s
involvement in Afghanistan since 9/11 and the response of Pakistan to it. The book
did not provide any sign of Indo-Pak conflict now reaching Afghanistan India has
faced severe and deadly attacks on her projects and personnel working in
Afghanistan.
Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West, by
Ahmed Rashid, Penguin Group, New York, 2012
The book focuses the recent events in Pakistan and their connection to the rest of the
world. Analysing the whole region, it presents a critical look of whatever is happening
in Pakistan. It highlights the core issues surrounding Pakistan’s political, military,
security and international positions. The book describes Pakistan as the most fragile
place in the world, most unstable country, and most vulnerable to terrorist violence
sliding down to the path of becoming a failed state. It raises two core issues to address
i.e. the role of the US in the region and Pakistan’s lack of self-sufficiency. The book
simultaneously praises and criticizes the US role in the region. It describes Pakistan in
sufficient to meet requirements without the aid from the west and other international
institutions as World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The book describes the
Government in Pakistan as weak and provides a pessimistic vision regarding the
solution of the conflicts between Pakistan and her neighbours. The book while
presenting the interconnectedness of Afghanistan and Pakistan pretends the future of
the region moving towards greater conflicts and contradictions. However, the book
has concentrated only the US role in the future of region in general and Pakistan and
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Afghanistan in particular. It ignores the regional potential to meet the problems. It
also ignored the consequences of NATO exit and Taliban resurgence overall the
region. It also falls short to cover the strategic designs of Pakistan to map out new
arrangements in Afghanistan to reconcile the terrorist groups in the mainstream
politics. It also ignored the potential gains in the vision of Pakistan’s policy makers
while reconciling Haqqani Network and Taliban in the Afghan politics. Thus, the
study attempts to fill the gap while addressing the designs of Pakistan to frame the
future of Afghanistan to ensure her own secure future.
“India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, by Dr. Mondira
Dutta, World Focus, Vol. XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008
The paper deals with the geo-strategic location of Afghanistan and her significance
for the regions adjacent. It provides an insight how Afghanistan became live in global
scenario, particularly amongst Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China, the United States and
India in post-9/11 era. It highlights the role India has played in reconstructing
Afghanistan since 9/11. It presents a wide description of India’s interests,
opportunities and challenges in Afghanistan. It deals with the socio-economic and
security aspects of Indio-Afghan engagements. It provides a significant overview of
the security risks for India in Afghanistan taking into consideration the attacks,
kidnappings and killings of Indian workers since the resurgence of Taliban. It also
deals with the implications of Indo-Afghan relations in a global context. The paper
focuses India’s efforts to reduce her dependence on Pakistan to reach Afghanistan and
Central Asia. However, some other issues are also significant in Indo-Afghan
relations that have necessitated the elaboration of the dimensions touched by this
paper. These include Pakistan’s comeback in Afghan affairs, the US troop’s
withdrawal, the Taliban reconciliation process etc. These changing circumstances
have posed new challenges for India’s Afghan policy and the study attempts to focus
these new dimensions.
“US Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Strategy”, Centre for Public
Policy & Governance, Forman Christian College, Lahore, Policy Brief No. 04,
August 2011
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The Centre for Public policy & Governance held a daylong policy dialogue on 28th of
July 2011. The policy brief discussed Pakistan’s Afghan policy and Counter
Terrorism & Counter Extremism Strategies in the light of US withdrawal from
Afghanistan. A broad consensus emerged that Pakistan’s Strategic Depth strategy
needs revisiting as it has resulted in militarization and radicalization of Afghan
society. It also agreed that the state of Pakistan has provided institutional patronage to
the militant organizations. Taking into consideration the significance of Pakistan in
Afghan issue, it suggested that Pakistan should facilitate peace process rather than try
to monopolize it. Acknowledging India’s regional power status, better governance
than Pakistan and robust economy, the policy brief held that Pakistan’s policy off
confrontation with India was misplaced. It suggests that Pakistan’s Afghan Policy
needs to be flexible and accommodative towards India’s interests in Pakistan. It also
presents a consensus that Pakistan needs to come out of her conspiracy theories and
blaming others, and start assessing the situation according to the changing realities. It
also suggests that the government of Pakistan needs to frame comprehensive policies
against extremism and terrorism, and act honestly against this. However, it has not
provided any space for India’s role in the future of Afghanistan as well as the region.
It has ignored the contribution of India to the reconstruction process in Afghanistan
and the goodwill India has won in that country. It has also ignored the designs of
Pakistan to involve the Haqqani Network in the Afghan national reconciliation
process. Thus, the study attempts to fill this gap.
“Prospects for Indian-Pakistani Cooperation in Afghanistan”, A report of the
CSIS Program on Crisis, Conflict and Cooperation, by Sadika Hameed, Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2012
The report presents the views of different persons regarding the India-Pakistan-
Afghanistan cooperation for their interests. It first discusses the bilateral relations
between Afghanistan & Pakistan, Pakistan & India and India & Pakistan. Then it
explores the mutual benefits for the three nations at trilateral forum. It scrutinizes the
economic benefits for these nations while securing energy sources and gas reserves
from Central Asia. Besides it, the report focuses the enhancement of trade relations
that will benefit India & Pakistan to have access to cheaper goods and increase
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employment. It focuses the requirement of this trilateral partnership to address
security risks as illegal trade of narcotics, organized crime and terrorism. Thus, the
report largely seeks to explore the areas of cooperation for India and Pakistan,
particularly in Afghanistan. It goes to the extent of suggesting that security
agreements between India & Pakistan is possible to address terrorism, enhance the
capacity of Afghan National Security Forces and stabilize Afghanistan. However,
there are some diverge interests of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan. There are also
some reports suggesting the role of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies against the
interests of India in Afghan soil. India has also lost some significant work force in
deadly attacks during the process of reconstructing Afghanistan. There is also
suspicion regarding the designs of Pakistan for installing the regime in Afghanistan
that will serve her strategic depth against India. Thus, besides the optimistic approach,
there is requirement of being cautious regarding the activities of Pakistan in
Afghanistan. The study attempts to address this aspect also.
“India’s Afghan Journey: Where from Here?”, By Attar Rabbani, Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 20, Issue-1, 2013
The paper presents the changing circumstances in the South Asian region since 9/11
and India’s opportunities to engage her in the US-led war in Afghanistan. It presents a
detailed and comprehensive part regarding the interests of India in Afghanistan
including terrorism, nexus of militant outfits and India’s concerns, Afghanistan as a
transit route between the regions and India’s desire to access the energy resources of
Central Asia etc. The paper also presents the challenges for India in the form of
Taliban resurgence, Pakistan’s comeback in Afghan affairs, US withdrawal and
China’s involvement. It then focuses the concerns of India vis-à-vis Pak designs of
using Afghanistan as her Strategic depth. It also visualizes policy-deficit on the part of
India to deal Pakistan and address the issue of instability in South Asia. However,
India’s policies since last decade are worth of appreciation. The intra-regional and
inter-regional economic integration designs of India aim at the peace, prosperity,
development and stability of the region. The larger part of India’s Afghan policy also
includes the desire to integrate South Asia with the Central and West Asia while re-
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building Afghanistan as a transit route. Thus, the study attempts to deal this aspect
also.
Besides it, the study involves the analysis of other significant books, research papers,
reports and policy briefs of international and national nature.
Chapter 2
India’s Engagements with
Afghanistan: Brief Historical
Perspective
Chapter – 2 India’s Engagements with Afghanistan: Brief Historical Perspective
18
he geo-strategic and geo-economic significance of Afghanistan lies with her
location as positioned between the three important regions of South, Central and
West Asia. The significance of this country for the South Asian region in general and
India in particular has increased with her addition to the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The shift in India’s Foreign Policy necessitated by
the process of globalization, economic liberalization, security threats in the form of
religious extremism and terrorism, energy requirements, and extended neighbourhood
orientations has placed Afghanistan at the centre. India believes in a democratic,
stable and peaceful Afghanistan essential not only for the regional but also for the
global security, development as well as peace. For this reason, India has pledged more
than US $2 billion since the overthrow of Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However,
before analysing the Indo-Afghan relations since 9/11, it is essential to have a brief
description of their relations in a historical context.
2.1 India-Afghanistan Relations: Pre-1947 Period
India and Afghanistan share strong historical and cultural bondages.1 The socio-
cultural and geographical dimensions reflect the long legacy of the close ties between
the two nations. Historians, while describing the long background of their relationship
to four thousand years or beyond it, are of the opinion that people of the two countries
represent joint cultural relations among the world nations.2 Dated back to the Ancient
Hindu Kingdoms3 that were existent during the conquest of Alexander the Great4, the
historical and .cultural legacy of Indo-Afghan relations is evident with the fact that
1 Latha A. Pandit, “India and Her Neighbours: Changing Perceptions”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII,
No. 06, June 2011, p.342
2 Farida Nekzad, “Indo-Afghan Cultural, Historic Relations”, Foreign Policy Research Centre, No.
07, p.120
3 The ancient Indian literature as Vedas, Mahabharata, Ramayana and Puranas mentioned the
Ancient Indian Kingdoms. All these kingdoms are located in the Indian Sub-Continent, comprising
the modern- day countries of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri
Lanka. Some of the kingdoms are also partly in neighbouring countries of China, Iran and the
Central Asian Republics
4 Alexander III of Macedon (356-323 BC) commonly known as Alexander the Great, was a king of
Macedon, a state in northern ancient Greece. He was born in 356 BC and tutored by Aristotle until
the age of 16. By the age of 30, he had carried one of the largest empires of the ancient world,
stretching from the Lonian Sea to the Himaliyas.
T
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after Alexander moved back, Chandragupta Maurya5 focused the north-western India
(present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan) and defeated Satrapies6 left in place by
Alexander.7 Historically, from Alexander the Great to Central Asian Turks to
Mughals,8 Afghanistan remained a route for almost every military journey into India.
From the cultural point of view, the country also served as a gateway for the spread of
Buddhism and Sufi Islam; the Arab-India exchanges of knowledge; and the arts and
aesthetics of Greek and Persia.9 The ruling empires of India, Iran and Central Asia
always found her as a borderland region. The territory of Afghanistan as captured by
Chandragupta Maurya from the Greeks in 305 BC by defeating Seleucus,10 latter
expanded into present-day Kabul, Kandahar and Gazni.11 During the Empire of
Asoka,12 the country as a centre of Buddhist art and culture became a part of the
Indian empire.13 The Buddhist influence in the region is evident by the presence of
Bamiyan Buddha monuments14 in that country destroyed by the Taliban in 2001.15
5 Chandragupta Maurya was the founder of the Mauryan Empire and the first emperor to unify India
into one state. He ruled from 322 to 298 BC. He succeeded in conquering and subjugating almost
the entire Indian subcontinent by the end of his reign. His empire extended from Bengal and
Assam in the east, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, east and southeast Iran in the west, Kashmir in the
north to the Deccan Plateau in the south
6 Alexander the Great left behind the Satrapies when he returned westwards. In 305
BC, Chandragupta Maurya led a series of campaigns to retake the Satrapies. Seluces I
Nicator fought to defend these territories, but both sides made peace in 303 BC. The treaty ended
the Seleucid–Mauryan war and allowed Chandragupta to control these regions
7 V. Chandrasekaran, “Afghanistan: India’s Interests”, Defence and Diplomacy, Vol. 01, No. 01,
October 2011, p.74
8 The Mughal Empire was an imperial power in the Indian subcontinent from about 1526 to 1707
(though it lingered for another century). The Mughals were Muslims and at the height of their
power in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. They controlled most of the subcontinent extending
from Bengal in the east to Balochistan in the west, Kashmir in the north to the Kaveri basin in the
south. The last emperor, Bahadur Shah II had authority over only the city of Shah Jahanabad. He
supported the Indian Rebellion of 1887 and was overthrown by the British, and the last remnants
of the empire were taken over by the British Raj
9 Gautam Mukhopadhaya, “India”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.
C., 2010, p.28
10 Seleucus himself was one of the Macedonians who started his military career as a young man and
became a senior officer in Alexander’s staff by 326 BC. Along with some of his fellows in the
empire carved by Alexander the Great, he crossed the Hydaspes River in the Indian subcontinent.
In 324 BC, Seleucus was among those Alexander required to marry Iranian princesses
11 D Choudhury, “India-Afghanistan: Strategic Stakes”, Royal College of Defence Studies, July 2011,
pp.04-05
12 Ashoka Maurya (304-223 BC) commonly known as Ashoka the Great was an Indian emperor of
Maurya Dynasty who ruled almost the entire Indian subcontinent from 269 to 232 BC. His empire
stretched from the Hindu Kush Mountains in Afghanistan to present-day Bangladesh and the
Indian state of Assam in the east, and northern Kerela and Andhra Pradesh in the south
13 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan, USA, 2002, pp.56-57
14 The Buddhas of Bamiyan were 6th century monumental statues of standing Buddha carved into the
side of a cliff in the Bamyan valley in the Hazarajat region of central Afghanistan, 230 km
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Kabul, since the first century, was the regional trade centre for the export of goods
and other Indian services to east and west. With this trade, India’s culture also spread
to other regions through the same route.16 Mahmud of Gazni17 invaded India
seventeen times between 1001 and 1027 followed by Mohammed Ghori’s18 seven
invasions.19 Sultan Mahmood Ghaznavi also invaded to promote the Islamic religion.
Dari language became popular in her Punjab and northern parts during the same
period. The reign of Sultan Mahmood Ghaznavi also used her people as employees
and deployed her troops in the Ghazni forces.20
The relations between the two countries improved further during the reign of
Ghorids21 who took power in India after the Ghaznavi Empire. A large number of
scientific personalities left Khurasan (then name of Afghanistan) to live here. The
culture of India influenced the great Afghan personalities such as Rahman Baba,22
northwest of Kabul at an altitude of 2,500 meters. However, Taliban dynamited and destroyed
these monuments in March 2001 after declaring them as idols. International opinion strongly
condemned the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas
15 D Choudhury, “India-Afghanistan: Strategic Stakes”, Royal College of Defence Studies, July 2011,
p.05
16 Farida Nekzad, “Indo-Afghan Cultural, Historic Relations”, Foreign Policy Research Centre, No.
07, p.121
17 Yamin ad-Dawlah Abdul-Qasim Mahmud Ibn Sebuktegin (971-1030), commonly known as
Mahmud of Ghazni, was the most prominent ruler of the Ghaznavid Empire. In the name of Islam,
he conquered the eastern Iranian lands and the northwestern Indian subcontinent from 997 to his
death in 1030. Mahmud turned the former provincial city of Ghazna into the wealthy capital of an
extensive empire that covered most of today's Afghanistan, eastern Iran, Pakistan and north-
western India
18 Sultan Shahab-ud-din Muhammad Ghori (1150-1206) also called as Muhammad of Ghori, was one
of the rulers of the Ghurid dynasty from the famous house of Sur who were rulers of Ghor for five
hundred years. He has the credit of laying the foundation of Muslim domination in India that lasted
for several centuries. He reigned over a territory spanning present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan and
northern India
19 Robert Boggs, “India’s Afghan Policy: Time for a Defensive Re-Calibration”, Foreign Policy
Research Centre, No. 07, p.29
20 Farida Nekzad, “Indo-Afghan Cultural, Historic Relations”, Foreign Policy Research Centre, No.
07, p.122
21 The Ghurids or Ghorids were a Sunni Muslim dynasty, possibly Afghan or eastern Iranian Tajiks,
who established rule over parts of modern day Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and northern India
from 1148 to 1215. The dynasty succeeded the Ghaznavid Empire and expanded Muslim rule
deeper into Hindustan. The Ghorid Empire centred in present-day Ghor province of Afghanistan
22 Abdul Rahman, commonly known as Rahman Baba, born in the high hills of Afghanistan, was a
great poet in the history of Pashto literature. He had a deep passion for God and a unique and
creative way of praying to God through the gift he had i.e. poetry. Rahman Baba published two
books from his collections of poetry. People admired his work, from Afghanistan to Central Asia
to the Indian Subcontinent. Everyone wanted his books, be it for political, religious or other
interests and desires. Due to his popularity, Afghans gave him an honourable name "Baba"
(Grandfather of the nation)
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Pir-e-Roshan23 and Khoshhal Khan24 whose works developed the Pashto literature
during the tenth and eleventh century.25 Northern India during the fifteenth and early
part of sixteenth century witnessed the rule of Lodi dynasty26 of Pashtuns from
Delhi.27 During the sixteenth century, the literature of Dari Farsi found its way in
different parts of India. The period also witnessed the spread of Islamic religion,
Islamic Sophism, Khurasani (Afghan) masonry and other cultural phenomenon.
People from Afghanistan frequenting India to sell their goods and dry fruits were
common to observe.28 Afghanistan, besides the trade transit, also experienced the
Indian culture and sciences.29 The great Mughul’s also descended from Kabul and
Khandahar to rule from Agra and Delhi from 1526 to 1707.30 The period between the
sixth to eighteenth centuries witnessed the cultural merge of the two countries in
different fields with intellectual and cultural exchanges. Indian empires have ruled the
region over 650 years31 and no other nation has been able to rule this region in the
following period. During the British rule of Indian subcontinent, the region appeared
23 Bayazid Khan, popularly known as Pir-e-Roshan, was a Pashtu warrior poet and intellectual of the
Barak/Urmar (known in present day as Burkhi) tribe who wrote in Pashto, Persia and Arabic. He
was born just outside Jullundur (Punjab) but early in his childhood, his father moved the family
back to Kaniguram, the Burki heartland in today's South Waziristan. He was the first Pushtun to
lead a major insurgency against the Mughal emperor Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar. He started the
insurgency movement from his base in Kaniguram known as Roshaniya (enlightened) movement,
carried on against the emperor's troops by his children and then grandchildren. The Roshaniya
movement spanned almost a century (1560–1638)
24 Khushal Khan Khattak (1613-1689), also called Khushal Baba, was a Pashtun poet, warrior and
scholar, and chief of the Khattak tribe of the Pashtuns. He preached the union of all Pashtuns, and
encouraged revolt against the Mughal Empire promoting Pashtun nationalism through poetry.
Khushal is the first Afghan mentor who presents his theories for the unity of the Afghan tribes
against foreign forces and the creation of a nation-state. He wrote many works in Pashto and Persia
and became the national poet of Afghanistan
25 Farida Nekzad, “Indo-Afghan Cultural, Historic Relations”, Foreign Policy Research Centre, No.
07, p.121
26 Lodi dynasty made of an Afghan tribe (Pashtun People) ruled northern India from 1451 to 1526.
Bahlul Khan Lodi was the founder of Lodi dynasty when he replaced the Sayyid
Dynasty. However, the dynasty ended after Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodi in the Battle of Panipat in
1526
27 Robert Boggs, “India’s Afghan Policy: Time for a Defensive Re-Calibration”, Foreign Policy
Research Centre, No. 07, p.29
28 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.412
29 Farida Nekzad, “Indo-Afghan Cultural, Historic Relations”, Foreign Policy Research Centre, No.
07, p.122
30 Rort Boggs, “India’s Afghan Policy: Time for a Defensive Re-Calibration”, Foreign Policy
Research Centre, No. 07, p.30
31 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans: 500 BC - 1957 AD, London, 1958, p.450
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as a playing field of the Great Game32 between imperialist British and Czarist
Russia.33 The Anglo-Afghan wars34 during the nineteenth century led a number of
Afghan singers and artists to left for India. During the First World War, Amir
Habibullah35 of Afghanistan accepted the proposal of India to cooperate after his
declaration of Jehad against Britons. Besides it, Raja Mahandara Partabh,36 who was
in exile, established an Indian interim administration in Kabul. In addition to this, a
number of Indian teachers were engaged in the Habibia High School by the approval
of the Afghan king that further encouraged the relations between the two
neighbours.37 The Cultural mix between their people was so intense that a good
number of Indians resort to poetry in Dari language. Nevertheless, the poets of
32 The Great Game was a term for the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and
the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia. The classic Great Game period generally
regarded as running approximately from the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813 to the Anglo-Russian
Convention of 1907, with a less intensive phase followed the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
Arthur Conolly, an intelligence officer of the British East India Company’s (Sixth) Bengal Light
Cavalry, attributes the term "The Great Game". However, it was British novelist Rudyard Kipling
who in his novel Kim (1901) introduced this term into the mainstream consciousness
33 D Choudhury, “India-Afghanistan: Strategic Stakes”, Royal College of Defence Studies, July 2011,
p.05
34 The First Anglo-Afghan War took place between the British East India Company
and Afghanistan from 1839 to 1842. It resulted in the deaths of 4,500 British and Indian soldiers,
besides 12,000 of their camp followers by the warring Afghan tribal fighters. It was one of the first
major conflicts during the Great Game. The Second Anglo-Afghan War fought 1878 to 1880. This
was the second time British invaded Afghanistan. The war ended in the treaty of Gandamak after
attaining all the British geopolitical objectives. Most of the British and Indian soldiers withdrew
from Afghanistan. The Third Anglo-Afghan War (also referred to as the Third Afghan War) began
on 06th of May 1919 and ended with an armistice on 08th of August 1919. It was a minor tactical
victory for the British. This reaffirmed the Durand Line as the political boundary between
the Emirate of Afghanistan and British India and the Afghans agreed not to foment trouble on the
British side. In the aftermath, the Afghans were able to resume the right to conduct their own
foreign affairs as a fully independent state
35 Habibullah Khan (1872-1919) was the Amir of Afghanistan from 1901 to 1919. He was born
in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Habibullah was a relatively secular, reform-minded ruler who
attempted to modernize his country. During his reign, he worked to bring Western medicine and
other technology to Afghanistan. In 1904, Habibullah founded the Habibia School as well as a
military academy. He also worked to put in place progressive reforms in his country. He instituted
various legal reforms and repealed many of the harshest criminal penalties. He greatly reduced
tensions with British India and signed a treaty of friendship in 1905, besides paying an official
state visit in 1907
36 Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh (1886-1979), popularly known as Aryan Peshwa, was a Hindu
freedom fighter, journalist, writer, Marxist revolutionary and social reformist of India. On
December 01, 1915 during the First World War, Pratap Singh established the first Provisional
Government of India at Kabul in Afghanistan as a Muslim government-in-exile of Free Hindustan,
with himself as President, Maulvi Barkatullah as Prime Minister, and Maulvi Abaidullah Sindhi as
Home Minister, declaring Jihad on the British. Due to his revolutionary ideas, Pratap had a good
relationship with Lenin, who invited him to Russia after her liberation and welcomed him
37 Farida Nekzad, “Indo-Afghan Cultural, Historic Relations”, Foreign Policy Research Centre, No.
07, p.122
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Afghanistan had cherished the people and nature of India. For instance, Amir
Khusrow38 called India as his motherland and restful heaven. He believed that the
songs and music of India were unique all over the world. Praising the diligence of
Indian woman he sung, “The way to love; you should learn from Hindu, Being
torched alive in the fire is not easy”.39
The modern ties between the two countries go back to the anti-colonial movements in
India during the early phase of the twentieth century. During this period, Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan,40 a Pashtun spiritual and political leader, formed an alliance with
Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress (INC). Khan (also called as
‘Frontier Gandhi’) led the movement of ‘Khudai-Khidmatgar’ against the British in
India.41 During the same period, the traders of Afghanistan were most popular in India
and strengthened the already established cultural contacts. At the time of the Partition
of India, people of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) refused to join Pakistan
because of their being predominantly Pashtuns.42 The legacy of Khan Abdul Ghaffar
38 Abul Hasan Yamin ud-Din Khusrow (1253-1325), commonly known as Amir Khusrow, was
an Indian musician, scholar and poet. He was an iconic figure in the cultural history of the Indian
subcontinent. A Sufi mystic and a spiritual disciple of Nizamuddin Auliya of Delhi, Amir
Khusrow was not only a notable poet but also a prolific and seminal musician. He wrote poetry
primarily in Persian. Besides the father of qawwali (the devotional music of the Sufis in the Indian
subcontinent), he is also credited with enriching Hindustani classical music by introducing Persian
and Arabic elements in it, and was the originator of the Khayal and Tarana styles of music
39 Farida Nekzad, “Indo-Afghan Cultural, Historic Relations”, Foreign Policy Research Centre, No.
07, pp.122-23
40 Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988), also known as, Fakhr-e Afghan (and Frontier Gandhi by
Indians) was born in Peshawar Valley of British India. He was a Pashtun political and spiritual
leader, a lifelong pacifist and devout Muslim, known for his non-violent opposition to the British
Raj in British India. In November 1929, Khan founded the Khudai-Khidmatgar (Servants of God)
movement, whose success triggered a harsh crackdown by the British Empire against him and his
supporters and they suffered some of the most severe repression of the Indian Independence
Movement. He strongly opposed the All India Muslim League’s demand for the partition of India.
However, after the partition, he pledged allegiance to Pakistan and demanded an autonomous
‘Pashtunistan’, an administrative unit within the country. Thus, the Pakistani government
frequently arrested him between 1948 and 1954, and in 1956 for the opposition to the ‘One
Unit’ scheme under which the government announced to merge the former provinces of West
Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan into one administrative unit of West
Pakistan. Khan also spent much of the 1960s and 1970s either in jail or in exile. In 1962,
the Amnesty International named Khan as the ‘Prisoner of Conscience’ of the Year. In addition to
the Nobel Prize for peace, he got Bharat Ratna in 1987. Khan died in 1988 in Peshawar and both
the sides of the Afghan civil war declared a truce upon his death to allow his burial in Jalalabad,
Afghanistan
41 D Choudhury, “India-Afghanistan: Strategic Stakes”, Royal College of Defence Studies, July 2011,
pp.05-06
42 Subash Kapila, “Afghanistan: India has Legitimate Strategic Interests in its Stability”, South Asia
Analysis Group, Paper 3149, p.44
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Khan was to strengthen the relations between post-independent India and
Afghanistan. The Pashtun issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan indirectly affected
Indo-Afghan relations given the hostility between India and Pakistan and New Delhi’s
close ties with Kabul.43
2.2 India-Afghanistan Relations: 1947-1979
The creation of Pakistan in 1947 separated the territory of India with that of
Afghanistan. However, they maintained close relations and signed the ‘Indo-Afghan
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’ in 1950.44 Indian songs and films earned
popularity amongst the people of Afghanistan and Indian movies became vital
component of the Afghan culture. Afghan shawls and dry fruits continued to maintain
their market in post-British India.45 Based on Rabindranath Tagore’s short story,
Indian film “Kabuliwallah”46 justifies the position of Pathan dry fruit sellers in the
memories of Indian people. Another significant aspect of their relations in post-1947
period was the approach of the two towards the Cold war alliance systems. Both the
superpowers (USA and USSR) invested heavily in Afghanistan during 1950s.
However, Afghanistan remained a missing link to the anti-Soviet chain of the United
States that ran from Europe to Pakistan via Turkey, Iraq and Iran.47 The other missing
link of the chain was India, which adopted the policy of Non-alignment to stay out of
the Cold War rivalry.48 This also brought India and Afghanistan closer to each other.
However, the US arming of Pakistan and refusal to provide military assistance to
Afghanistan pushed both the countries tilt towards USSR. In response to this,
President Khrushchev of the Soviet Union agreed to reorganise the Afghan Army and
provided economic aid over US $ 2.25 billion up to 1979.49 The increasing
dependence of Afghanistan on the Soviet aid further enhanced the ties between India
43 Harsh Pant, “India’s Challenge in Afghanistan: With Power Comes Responsibility”,
Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2010, p.37
44 Subash Kapila, “Afghanistan: India has Legitimate Strategic Interests in its Stability”, South Asia
Analysis Group, Paper 3149, p.44
45 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.78
46 Kabuliwala is a 1961 Bollywood film based on a story ‘Kabuliwala’ written by the Bengali
writer Rabindrenath Tagore. Heman Gupta directed this film starring Balraj Sahni, Usha Kiran,
Sajjan, Sonu and Baby Farida
47 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan, USA, 2002, p.226
48 David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?, New York, 2011, pp.45-46
49 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan, USA, 2002, p.226
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and Afghanistan. During the same period, India signed various agreements with the
governments in Afghanistan from Mohammad Daoud to Nur Mohamed Tarakki to
enhance her influence and promote cooperation.50 However, revolts broke out across
the country due to the conflict between the pro-Communist and anti-Communist
factions. These crises affected the relations between the two and the ‘Indo-Afghan
Joint Commission’, signed in 1976 to facilitate economic and technical assistance
programs became non-functional since 1978. These revolts also led to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
2.3 India-Afghanistan Relations: 1979-1989
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided an opportunity for India to re-engage
and enhance the bilateral relations.51 However, at the same time, it was the first
challenge to her foreign policy. The invasion put India in a difficult situation affecting
her prestige and credibility at the international level, as it caught her position in
between the NAM (Non-alignment Movement) of which it was a founding member
and the friendship treaty signed by India with the USSR in 1971.52 Despite this, the
government of the time opposed the Soviet intervention and called for an immediate
withdrawal of Soviet troops. The then Prime Minister, Charan Singh, expressed deep
concern over the issue and summoned the Soviet Ambassador to make clear the
position of country that the presence of the USSR troops in Afghanistan has adverse
consequences for the entire region.53 However, this stand was short lived and reversed
when Indira Gandhi came back to power in 1980.54 The shift is indicative with the
fact that her Ambassador to the UNO, B.C. Mishra became the first non-Soviet bloc
envoy to speak essentially for the Soviet position in the UN-General Assembly.55
India chose to abstain on key UN resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal from
50 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.80
51 Raghav Sharma, “India’s Relations with Afghanistan”, David Scott (Ed) Handbook of India’s
International Relations, London, 2011, p.107
52 P. S. Ghosh, R. Panda, “Domestic Support for Mrs. Gandhi’s Afghanistan Policy: The Soviet
Factor in Indian Politics”, Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 3, March 1983, p.261
53 Robert C. Horn, “Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship”, Asian Survey, Vol.
23, No. 3, March 1983, p.245
54 S. Muni, “India’s Afghan Policy Emerging from the Cold”, K. Warikoo (Ed) The Afghanistan
Crisis: Issues and Perspectives, New Delhi, 2002, p.335
55 Robert C. Horn, “Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship”, Asian Survey, Vol.
23, No. 3, March 1983, p.246
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Afghanistan.56 The country was among the first non-aligned nations to recognize the
government in Afghanistan established after the Soviet invasion.57 There were mainly
four factors conditioning India’s response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
First, Washington’s economic aid, supply of sophisticated arms and F-16 fighter
aircrafts to Pakistan; Second, Washington’s rapprochement with Beijing in which
Islamabad had played a key role; Third, a US naval build-up in the Indian Ocean
region; Fourth, a fear of Mujahideen victory giving Pakistan clear strategic leverage
in Afghanistan.58
India's concerns were borne out by the US National Security Adviser Brzezinski's
proposal that “Washington should work to reinforce the resilience against Soviet advances
by providing more aid to Pakistan” and that it should “keep the Afghan issue alive by
sustaining the resistance”.59 Her concerns deepened with the US involvement in Afghan
issue. As such, the CIA-ISI nexus moved Pakistan towards Islamic fundamentalism
that in turn spread to Afghanistan.60 The situation was more dangerous as it led to the
arms race in the region. India took the move of arming Pakistan by the US as a
threat.61 This forced her to look the Soviet invasion in a different angle to suit her own
interests. The country sought to enhance economic cooperation with the Soviet Union
and for the first time secured oil from the USSR.62 Soviet Union emerged as her major
supplier of defence equipment and space technology.63 India also increased her
investments in Afghanistan for the development of industrial, irrigational and
hydroelectric projects.64 During the visit of Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Shah
Mohammad Dost to New Delhi, Indira Gandhi expressed her willingness to reactivate
the ‘Indo-Afghan Joint Commission’. The first meeting of the Commission took place
56 Raghav Sharma, “India’s Relations with Afghanistan”, David Scott (Ed) Handbook of India’s
International Relations, London, 2011, p.108
57 Dr Siegfried O. Wolf, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Towards a More Robust Engagement”,
Foreign Policy Research Centre, No. 09, 2012, p.157
58 R. Horn, “Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship”, Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No.
3, March 1983, pp.248–249
59 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Game Plan, New York, p.265
60 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.80
61 Robert C. Horn, “Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship”, Asian Survey, Vol.
23, No. 3, March 1983, p.245
62 Robert W. Bradnock, “India's Foreign Policy since 1971”, Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1990, p.105
63 Raghav Sharma, “India’s Relations with Afghanistan”, David Scott (Ed) Handbook of India’s
International Relations, London, 2011, p.108
64 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.80
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at Kabul in May 1982, and India agreed to increase the number of exports to
Afghanistan.65 Thus, New Delhi started a direct deal with Kabul and the Soviet Union
praised her realistic approach towards Afghanistan.66 However, India’s official stand
remained firm on the principal of non-intervention. Indira Gandhi, after a meeting
with Britain's Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, stated, “No country is justified in
entering another country”.67 She again justified her position in a by-election speech
while reminding that Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan "only after Pakistan
started training the Afghan rebels and sending them in to topple the Government
there….nevertheless, India was opposed to the USSR's presence and it had told that country
so”.68
2.4 India Afghanistan Relations: 1989-2001
The withdrawal of Soviet Union led to the formation of Najibullah government in
Kabul and India supported this regime. Within a short span of time, a coalition of
Mujahideen forces headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani replaced the Najibullah
government in 1992.69 India remained active while providing humanitarian and
technical assistance.70 However, the factionalism in Rabbani government once again
led to the crises and Afghanistan witnessed a barbaric civil war.71 The civil war led to
the rise of Taliban that replaced the Rabbani government in 1996. Relations between
the two countries deteriorated after Taliban came to power in Afghanistan.72 The
Taliban rule was very antithetical to Indian interests73 and led her to cut off all the
65 Robert C. Horn, “Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship”, Asian Survey, Vol.
23, No. 3, March 1983, p.257
66 B. Chekhonin, “Soviet-Indian Friendship and Cooperation”, International Affairs, No. 5, May
1982, p.20
67 Robert C. Horn, “Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship”, Asian Survey, Vol.
23, No. 3, March 1983, p.246
68 R. Horn, “Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship”, Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No.
3, March 1983, pp.145–146
69 Raghav Sharma, “India’s Relations with Afghanistan”, David Scott (Ed) Handbook of India’s
International Relations, London, 2011, p.108
70 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.80
71 Raghav Sharma, “India’s Relations with Afghanistan”, in David Scott (Ed) Handbook of India’s
International Relations, London, 2011, p.108
72 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.412
73 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-
12, November-December, 2011, p.802-803
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relations with that country. India closed her Kabul Embassy in September 199674 and
refused to recognize the Taliban government with the fear of Afghanistan’s
emergence under the extremist regime of Taliban as what Dr Najibullah said, ‘a centre
of world smuggling for narcotic drugs…. Afghanistan will turn into a centre for terrorism’.75
Taliban’s close links with Pakistan to use Afghan territory as a hub of anti-Indian
militant activities further deteriorated the relations.76 India believed that in
cooperation with Pakistan, Taliban government allowed Kashmiri terrorists to train
within the territory of Afghanistan.77 Thus, the militant activities of Afghan
Mujahedeen in Kashmir valley turned the Taliban as a security threat for India.78
These years witnessed some 80,000 young men from the Madrassas of Pakistan who
got training in Afghanistan and later participated in militant activities in the region
including Afghanistan, Kashmir valley and Central Asian States.79 Many militants
arrested in Jammu & Kashmir either were from Afghanistan or have had training in
that country.80 The relations also witnessed a setback with the Kandahar Hijacking.81
Five terrorists of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) hijacked the Indian Airlines flight
IC 814 from Kathmandu and landed at Kandahar.82 The Taliban regime supported the
hijackers and prevented the Indian Commandos to take action against them.83 This
forced the Government of India to deal with the Taliban and the then External Affairs
Minister Jaswant Singh handed over three terrorists in exchange for 155 passengers
74 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.80
75 V. Schofield, “Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia”, London: Taurisparke,
2003, p.322
76 Siegfried O. Wolf, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Towards a More Robust Engagement”, Foreign
Policy Research Centre, No. 09, 2012, p.157
77 John Diamond, “Taliban, al-Qaeda linked to Kashmir”, USA Today, May 29, 2002
78 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.412
79 Neamatollah Novjumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, New York, 2002, p.131
80 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.775
81 On 24th of December 1999, the terrorist group HUJI hijacked the Indian Airlines Flight 814 (CI
814) on a routine flight from Kathmandu to New Delhi, first to the north Indian city of Amritsar
then from there to Lahore and thence to Dubai and finally landed in Kandahar. Taliban
government refused to allow India to use force against the hijackers and eventually moved to
protect them. After protracted negotiations with India, which led to the release of three
imprisoned terrorists, (Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar and Omar Saeed Sheikh), they let
the hijackers and their terrorist allies to go scot-free
82 C. Christine Fair, “India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints”, Century
Foundation Report, p.3
83 Jorge Heine and Partha Ghosh, “The Elephant in the War: India and the Afghan-Pakistan Link”,
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 17, No. 01, March 2011, p.54
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and the crew.84 In addition, at the behest of Pakistan’s Army, many Afghan militants
reportedly fought against India during the Kargil War in 1999.85 Some 200 Taliban
forces participated with Pakistan during this War.86 Thus, the activities of Taliban
closed all possibilities for India to accommodate with the extremist regime in
Afghanistan.
Anti-India activities of Taliban forced India to support the anti-Taliban Northern
Alliance (NA).87 Thus, India supported and established links with the Northern
Alliance to check the Taliban activities and maintain her influence.88 Besides the
technical advice by Indian defence advisors, the country provided high-altitude
weapons worth US $ 10 million to the NA,89 and extended humanitarian assistance to
the Afghan people in the form of medicine, vegetable oil, tea and emergency relief
material.90 India also established a hospital in Farkhor province of Tajikistan and
provided medical assistance to the NA.91 India, throughout the Taliban rule (1996-
2001), aimed at marginalizing the Taliban influence that brought her close to Iran and
Russia who were the other supporters of the NA.92 Thus, from 1992 until the removal
of Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan act as a ground for proxy war between Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia on one side, and Iran, India, and Russia on the other side.93 The relations
during the Taliban rule is apparent in the words of Mr M. H. Ansari, India’s former
Ambassador to Afghanistan, as, “A relationship with the Taliban was not attempted… as a
result of the treatment meted out to the Afghan Hindus and Sikhs. Much more serious in
Indian eyes were the Taliban pronouncements on Kashmir, the training of Kashmiris,
Pakistanis, and foreign militants in camps in Afghanistan… these touched the core of India’s
84 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.86
85 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-
12, November-December 2011, p.803
86 K. Santhanam (Ed), Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery, New Delhi, 2003,
pp.315–316
87 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.412
88 S. Muni, “India’s Afghan Policy Emerging from the Cold”, K. Warikoo (Ed), The Afghanistan
Crisis: Issues and Perspectives, New Delhi, 2002, p.341
89 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.81
90 S. Muni, “India’s Afghan Policy Emerging from the Cold”, K. Warikoo (Ed), The Afghanistan
Crisis: Issues and Perspectives, New Delhi, 2002, p.341
91 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.81
92 Raghav Sharma, “India’s Relations with Afghanistan”, David Scott (Ed) Handbook of India’s
International Relations, London, 2011, p.109
93 Haroun Mir, “Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C.,
2010, p.07
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vital interests and compelled New Delhi to strengthen (her) support and assistance to the
predominantly non-Pashtun Rabbani forces.”94 The event of 9/11 provided space for the
United States to attack Afghanistan in October 2001 that resulted in the fall of Taliban
government. This provided India an opportunity to move back strongly into that
country and regain her position. Since then, India has made extensive efforts in the
reconstruction of this war torn nation. India has become the fifth international and
largest regional donor to Afghanistan in post-Taliban era.
94 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.81
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ndo-Afghan relations in the 21st century have moved from the tradition of
historical and cultural ties to the development partnerships covering all the
sectors.1 India, since the fall of Taliban regime, is sincerely committed to the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. The 9/11 episode and the resultant US campaign for
‘Global War against Terror’ at the international level and ‘Operation Enduring
Freedom’ against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan provided India an opportunity to
pursue her foreign policy aspirations in the changing scenario.2 Thus, India got space
to advance her ‘Afghan Policy’ in post-9/11 era.3 Sharing the vision of a peaceful,
stable and secure Afghanistan with the US,4 India offered services for the US-led war
against terrorism5 and provided logistical support6 to stabilize Afghanistan.7 Since
then, the country has made extensive efforts in rebuilding the war torn nation that
have sustained and increased over the last twelve years. The post-9/11 era witnessed
global appreciation of India’s principled stand to counter terrorism and cooperation
with war on terror.8 India has become one of the primary donors with her pledge to
the process of Afghanistan reconstruction reaching US $ 02 billion. Her activities of
capacity building and skill development in Afghanistan range from “catering to
school children to technical capacity building”.9 Immediately after the fall of Taliban
regime, India’s then External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh went to Kabul to
attend the occasion when Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani handed over power to the new
interim administration on 22nd of December 2001.10 Taking it as an opportunity to re-
1 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.778
2 D Choudhury, “India-Afghanistan: Strategic Stakes”, Royal College of Defence Studies, July 2011,
p.09
3 Latha A. Pandit, “India and Her Neighbours: Changing Perceptions”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII,
No. 06, June 2011, p.342
4 Sayed Saleem Shahzad, “US Orchestrates Pakistan-India Talks,” Asia Today, September 30, 2009
5 Balraj Puri, “India and the War against Terrorism”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No.
40, 06-12 October 2001, p.3805
6 Madhav Nalapat, “Why the US Fumbled Afghanistan,” The Diplomat, October 09, 2011
7 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities: Economy Emerges as the Driving
Force”, World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.505
8 Mohammed Badrul Alam, “Basic Parameters of India’s Foreign Policy and Its Resilience”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.735
9 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.416
10 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.86
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engage that country,11 India eagerly offered the support to the interim administration
headed by Mr. Hamid Karzai. Reopening the Kabul Embassy during the same visit,12
Jaswant Singh spoke of the close ties between the two nations.13 The country
intensified for establishing ties with the new government on the account of having
good links with most of the leaders of Northern Alliance. Thus, the support to the NA
during 1990s strengthened her position in Kabul after 9/11.14 India started resuming
her relations and since then, both the nations maintained close political
consultations.15 Besides the Kabul Embassy, the country reopened her consulates in
Kandahar and Jalalabad and established two new consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-
Sharif.16 Many Afghan leaders, educated in the Indian Universities, favoured and
supported the bilateral engagements.17 Hamid Karzai also had obtained much of his
education in India.18 This created space for the two-way visits by the high dignitaries
of both the nations.19
India has accomplished much in terms of assistance for the development of
Afghanistan.20 The country has completed various projects contributing in social &
economic development, skills & capacity building, and science & technology up
gradation.21 The assistance also contributes in developing significant civil
infrastructure and human resource.22 The infrastructure development range from
building structures from public sanitation units including toilets to power transmission
11 Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Role in Afghanistan”, CIDOB Policy Research Project, January 2012, p.3
12 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.776
13 Ramesh Trivedi, India’s Relations with her Neighbours, Delhi, 2008, p.87
14 D Choudhury, “India-Afghanistan: Strategic Stakes”, Royal College of Defence Studies, July 2011,
p.09
15 Tridib Chakraborti, “India’s Relations with South Asia in 2010: A Journey of Crests and Troughs”,
World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.516
16 W. Raja, “The Complicated Tussle: Competing Interests of Regional Powers & Afghanistan’s
Neighbours”, Master of Defence Studies Research Project, Canadian Forces College, No. 38, p.36
17 D Choudhury, “India-Afghanistan: Strategic Stakes”, Royal College of Defence Studies, July 2011,
p.09
18 Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Role in Afghanistan”, CIDOB Policy Research Project, January 2012, p.3
19 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.776
20 Shashank Joshi, “Let India Help Afghanistan”, The Guardian, December 25, 2009
21 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.413
22 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities: Economy Emerges as the Driving
Force”, World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.505
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lines23 and India appears to be the largest regional and fifth international donor in the
reconstruction process.24 The unique feature of this assistance is that most aid of India
is unconditional,25 as it expands to multi-sector activities and gives full respect to the
priorities of Afghan people.26 The basic determinant of such assistance is the
realization that socio-economic development is essential for the stability in
Afghanistan as well as the whole region27 and thus, India maintained regular high-
level official contacts with that country.28 The long and short-term projects cover a
wide range of sectors in all parts of Afghanistan and all the projects are under way in
partnership with the Government of Afghanistan and in alliance with the Afghanistan
National Development Strategy.29 Despite attacks on her projects and personnel in
Afghanistan, India has not stopped to provide generous assistance to the war torn
country.30 India’s assistance to Afghanistan covers the basic amenities.31 India is
focusing other key areas of development including civil aviation, irrigation, power
generation, industry and rural development.32 This will surely help in building strong
economic ties between the two countries. The assistance and development partnership
covers following broad areas:
3.1 Political Development and Political Consciousness
Both the nations share the vision of peaceful and democratic Afghanistan and agree
that a stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan is necessary for peace, security
23 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “India’s Policy Towards Afghanistan”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No.
11-12, November-December 2011, p.804
24 W. Raja, “The Complicated Tussle: Competing Interests of Regional Powers & Afghanistan’s
Neighbours”, Master of Defence Studies Research Project, Canadian Forces College, No. 38, p.36
25 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.417
26 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “India’s Policy Towards Afghanistan”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No.
11-12, November-December 2011, p.804
27 Siegfried O. Wolf, “India–Afghanistan–Relations: Towards a More Robust Engagement”, Foreign
Policy Research Centre, No. 09, New Delhi, 2012, pp.157
28 Tridib Chakraborti, “India’s Relations with South Asia in 2010: A Journey of Crests and Troughs”,
World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.516
29 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December 2008, p.413
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and stability in the region.33 Afghanistan restored her democratic tradition while
conducting the Presidential and Parliamentary elections and India provided all
possible assistance in this regard. The commitment to restore democracy includes the
construction of the new Parliament building in Kabul that is on the way of
completion.34 Another aspect to establish democracy in that country is the exchange
of visits between the Parliament of India with the Wolesi and Meshrano Jirgas of the
Afghanistan Parliament.35 Besides it, India’s Bureau of Parliamentary Study &
Training provides training to the officials of the National Assembly Secretariat of
Afghanistan.36 Based on the Memorandum of Understanding between the Election
Commissions of the two countries, regular exchanges, mutual visits for study and
observation as well as training activities also took place between the members and
officials of these institutions.37 Taking into consideration the significance of civil
services in strengthening the democracy, India has provided training to the Afghan
police officers, diplomats and civil servants.38 The country deputed twenty Civil
Servants to the various departments of Afghanistan government under a tripartite
‘Afghanistan-India-UNDP’ programme of Capacity for Afghanistan Public
Administration (CAP).39 These officers, since 2007, are working as Coaches and
Mentors in the key Afghan Ministries to enhance professional skill development in
Afghan Public Administration.40
33 For details See Annexure – II
34 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.776
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3.2 Economic Development
Both the countries have the realization that economic development of Afghanistan is a
prerequisite for the stability and peace. There are several agreements under process
focusing the energy requirements of Afghanistan.41 The Preferential Trade
Agreement, signed on 06th of March 2003,42 between the two nations provides
Afghanistan duty-free access to the import of dried figs, mulberries, pistachio, roasted
pine nuts, fresh melons, asafoetida, lapis lazuli, ruby and emeralds.43 The Agreement
also bears 50% duty concession extended on green, red, golden and black raisins,
walnuts, almonds, fresh grapes, apples, apricots, pomegranates, anise, caraway,
linseed, alpha and sesame seeds, dried apricots, plums and sour cherries.44 In October
2011, they also signed two Memorandums of Understanding to cooperate in the areas
of exploration, production, research & training relating to hydrocarbons as oil & gas,
investment in mining, mineral exploration and capacity building in the field of
geosciences.45 The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) organized ‘Delhi
Investment Summit on Afghanistan’ in partnership with the Governments of India and
Afghanistan and in cooperation with Afghan Investment and other business
organizations. The summit took place at Hotel Taj Palace, New Delhi on 28th of June
2012. The objective of the summit was to attract foreign investment into Afghanistan
in the areas including mining, hydrocarbons, infrastructure, agriculture, industry,
capacity building, health and services.46 Besides the participation by India’s External
Affairs Minister in the Kabul Conference on 20th of July 2010, India also took part in
the first Afghanistan international Investors Conference held in Dubai in November
2010.47 Earlier, in 2005, India has set up the Common Facility and Tool Room at Pul-
41 Siegfried O. Wolf, “India–Afghanistan–Relations: Towards a More Robust Engagement”, Foreign
Policy Research Centre, No. 09, New Delhi, 2012, pp.160-161
42 For details see Annexure – IV
43 “Rebuilding Afghanistan: India at Work”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, p.9,
accessible at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/180_Rebuilding-Afghanistan-
updated.pdf, (accessed on November 02, 2012, at 21:15)
44 “Rebuilding Afghanistan: India at Work”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, p.9,
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updated.pdf, (accessed on November 02, 2012, at 21:15)
45 For details see Annexure – XI
46 “Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India,
available at: http://dsafghan.in/about-the-summit.html, (accessed on January 11, 2013, at 16:55)
47 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
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e-Charkhi in Afghanistan to speed up the process initiated by the Afghan government
to restore Industrial Park, encourage industrial activity and promote mutual trade.
Acknowledging India’s contribution, Mr. Moktasil, Director of the Pul-e-Charkhi
Industrial Complex said, “We are very grateful to India for its help. Without their efforts,
the Industrial Park could not have restarted. Our workers are also trained at the Common
Tool Room Facility. 250 units get power supply now”.48 Besides it, India’s growing
market is now open for Afghan products.49 Thus, the economic cooperation and
collaboration in the Industry and Commerce sector will enable Afghanistan to
integrate effectively with the Indian economy as well as other economies in South,
Central and Southeast Asia.
3.3 Development of Basic Amenities
The main aspect of India’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan includes the
humanitarian assistance.50 The country has played a significant role in developing the
health sector in Afghanistan. India sped up a team of thirteen doctors and paramedics
to that country to attend the urgent medical needs in the end of 2001, and set camps
for fitting artificial limbs in different parts of that country.51 Five Indian Medical
Missions (IMMs) working in Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandhar and Mazar-e-Sharif
provide free medical consultation and medicines to serve the poor patients.52 Every
month, nearly 30,000 Afghans get free medical consultations and medicine through
these IMMs.53 India has upgraded various hospitals in that country and the most
significant among them is the rehabilitation of the Indira Gandhi Institute for Child
48 “Rebuilding Afghanistan: India at Work”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India,
p.14, accessible at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/180_Rebuilding-Afghanistan-
updated.pdf, (accessed on November 02, 2012, at 21:15)
49 Siegfried O. Wolf, “India–Afghanistan–Relations: Towards a More Robust Engagement”, Foreign
Policy Research Centre, No. 09, New Delhi, 2012, p.160
50 C. Christine Fair, “Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in
Afghanistan”, The Washington Quarterly, 2011, pp.179-192
51 C. Christine Fair, “Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in
Afghanistan”, The Washington Quarterly, 2011, pp.179-192
52 “Afghanistan First: India at Work”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, p.23,
accessible at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/189_Afghanistan-First.pdf,
(accessed on January 11, 2013, at 20:36)
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Health (IGICH), the largest paediatric hospital in Afghanistan.54 In 2008, India
rendered ten ambulances to the Afghan Ministry of Public Health that are now
operational in Kabul and the regional hospitals in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and
Mazar-e-Sharif.55 India’s assistance also includes the capacity building of Afghan
Doctors while attaching them to the reputed Indian Hospitals. The batches of IGICH
specialists are getting training at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS),
New Delhi. Under various Small Development Project Schemes, India has
constructed the basic health clinics in the border provinces of Badakshan, Balkh,
Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nimroz, Nooristan, Paktia and Paktika.56
Besides it, during the visit of Afghan President to India in January 2009, India gifted
250,000 metric tonnes of wheat to that country under the ‘New Food Aid’ program to
help the countries food crisis.57
3.4 Educational Development
India, since 2001, has been providing educational and vocational scholarships to the
Afghans. In 2006, they signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in
the Field of Education’ to encourage contacts and cooperation between the
educational institutions of the two nations. The Memorandum also includes the
exchange of research material, publications, educational literature, teaching aids,
scholars, teachers, academics etc.58 In June 2002, World Food Programme (WFP) was
facing a serious resource shortfall and was looking for donors to fund the new school
feeding operation. India came forward to support the ‘Back to School’ campaign of
Afghanistan and under a ‘School Feeding Programme’ administered through the
WFP, India supplies 100 gm of fortified, high-protein biscuits to nearly two million
54 “Rebuilding Afghanistan: India at Work”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India,
p.20, accessible at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/180_Rebuilding-Afghanistan-
updated.pdf, (accessed on November 02, 2012, at 21:15)
55 “India and Afghanistan: A Development Partnership”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic
of India, p.16, accessible at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/176_india-and-
afghanistan-a-development-partnership.pdf, (accessed on November 02, 2012, 21:30)
56 “India and Afghanistan: A Development Partnership”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic
of India, p.16, accessible at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/176_india-and-
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57 For details see Annexure – VI
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schoolchildren every day.59 The significance of such support is evident from the
following statement of Charles Vincent, WFP Country Director, Afghanistan, as, “We
are very grateful to the Government of India for this contribution. It has made a dramatic
difference in our efforts to spread school feeding in Afghanistan and improve both health and
educational condition of many poor Afghan children”.60 The reconstruction of Habibia
School in Kabul is also a significant aspect of India’s educational assistance to
Afghanistan.61 The Government of India offers various scholarships to the Afghan
people who come to India for higher studies and short courses with the aim to produce
and train a future generation capable of assisting the Afghan government in
addressing various needs.62 The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) has
offered 500 scholarships a year to the Afghan people under a Special Scholarship
Scheme.63 Under this scheme, students selected on a countrywide competition in
Afghanistan get admission to Indian universities for undergraduate and post-graduate
courses. In order to ensure countrywide coverage, there is the reservation of six seats
for each of the 34 provinces of that country under this scheme.64 Assessing the
significance of agriculture to bring development in the war torn country, India has
offered 100 fellowships of study every year to the Afghan nationals for Master’s and
Ph. D. programmes in Indian Universities besides the 200 fellowship graduate courses
to the Afghan people for degree programmes in agriculture and related areas.65
3.5 Afghan Capacity Building
The most vital feature of India’s assistance programme in Afghanistan is the capacity
building of Afghan people. The bilateral development partnership between the two
59 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, pp.776-777
60 “Rebuilding Afghanistan: India at Work”, Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India,
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nations currently focuses the capacity development as well as building Afghan
institutions.66 During the visit of Dr. Manmohan Singh to Afghanistan in 2005, they
agreed to launch a “Skill Building Initiative” in Afghanistan in partnership with the
CII and the UN.67 Capacity building is very essential in making the Afghan people
self-dependent and self-reliant. In this respect, the establishment of the ‘India-
Afghanistan Vocational Training Centre’ in Afghanistan by the CII in cooperation
with the Afghan Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is very significant. The Centre
provides training to one thousand Afghan youths in the traits of carpentry, masonry,
welding, plumbing and tailoring with the purpose to identify trainers and assessors
from the trained personnel to continue the training modules on a self-sustainable
basis.68 The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA)69 carried out a Women’s
Vocational Training Centre in Bagh-e-Zanana, Kabul called as ‘Community Learning
and Business Resource Centre’ that provides training to thousands of Afghan women
particularly in Garment Making & Embroidery, Nursery Plantation & Greenhouse
Plants and Food & Fruit Processing.70 Under the Indian Technical and Cooperation
Programme, India offers 500 annual short-term ITEC training programmes for
Afghan public servants in any technical and professional institution of their choice in
India.71 Capacity building programmes are also underway in the fields of diplomacy,
media and information, civil aviation, agricultural research & education, health care &
medicinal science, tourism, education, standardisation, rural development, public
administration, electoral management and administration, and local governance.72
66 Siegfried O. Wolf, “India–Afghanistan–Relations: Towards a More Robust Engagement”, Foreign
Policy Research Centre, No. 09, New Delhi, 2012, pp.158-159
67 For details see Annexure – II
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3.6 Infrastructural and Technical Development
In 2005, India’s Prime Minister announced an innovative scheme of ‘Small
Development Projects’ (SDPs)73 that have direct impact on community life in
Afghanistan as the local community gets immediate benefits from it.74 Eighty-four
small projects under different stages of implementation in 19 provinces justify India’s
latest efforts to accelerate the massive institution building in the war torn nation.75
Besides it, two interesting NGO-supported projects including ‘Murad Khane’ in
Kabul and ‘Hand-in-Hand Project’ in Balkh province also got extensive support from
India.76 Taking into account the land-locked nature of Afghanistan and her
dependence on others for trading with rest of the world, India has supported major
infrastructure projects to reduce such dependence of Afghanistan.77 In this regard, the
contribution lies with the construction of a ring road connecting this country to the
Iranian ports facilitating her trade with India and the Gulf states.78 India’s Border
Roads Organization (BRO) has constructed this 218-kilometer long Zaranj-Delaram
highway79 in this country linking it up to the Chabahar Port.80 The highway provides
connectivity to the very end of southwestern Afghanistan and Iran by linking Zaranj
to the Kandahar-Herat highway.81 It facilitates the movement of goods and services
73 For details see Annexure – II
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via Iran.82 Following the completion of the construction work in January 2009,83 the
President of Afghanistan Mr. Hamid Karzai and India’s then External Affairs Minister
Mr. Pranab Mukherjee inaugurated the highway on 22nd of January 2009.84 The
highway reduces dependence of the country on Pakistan to reach the sea.85 It provides
a supplementary and shorter access of that country to the sea via Iran.86 India also
built some inner-city roads including 40 kilometres in Zaranj, 10 kilometres in
Gurguri and 08 kilometres connecting Gurguri to Razia.87
Dr. Singh also announced to adopt 100 villages in Afghanistan to promote integrated
rural development by introducing solar electrification and rainwater harvesting.88 The
assistance also includes the generation and transmission of power. In this respect,
India has built a power transmission line to Kabul.89 The process of constructing 220
KV Double Circuit Transmission Line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and Sub-station at
Chimtala to bring additional power from the northern grid to Kabul, began in 2005.90
India completed the elected transmission line projects for uninterrupted power supply
in Kabul.91 The transmission line that passes over the Salang Range at a height of
4000 metres is already in use since 21st of January 2009. The line made it possible for
Kabul to enjoy uninterrupted 24-hour power supply for the first time in May 2009.92
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The other ongoing project is the Salma Dam Power Project in Herat province on river
Hari Rud.93 There are hundreds of Afghans and Indians working in the construction of
this Dam.94 Taking into consideration the country’s ill public transport facilities due
to the huge destruction and increasing pressure of returning refugees, India gifted 400
buses95 supplemented by other 200 mini-buses. The country also provided 105 utility
vehicles to Municipalities including water and cesspit tankers and garbage dumpers.96
As a part of her military assistance programme, the country provided various
packages including the delivery of 300 military transport vehicles97 besides the team
of Indian Army Officers impart training in military field craft to the Afghan National
Army.98 India also gifted 10 ambulances to the public hospitals in five cities of
Afghanistan.99 With the intention to make the national carrier Ariana Afghan Airlines
quickly operational, the country provided three airbus aircrafts along with essential
spares, besides sending the retrained airline officials for capacity development in the
civilian aviation sector.100 The country also pledges to extend further training
opportunities in air traffic control, airport management, pilot and navigational
training.101 For the development of transmission sector, India undertook a project to
facilitate uplink Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA) from Kabul and downlinks
in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan.102 Indian Satellite INSAT 3A transmits the Radio
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94 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
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and Television signals to these provinces.103 The country has also restored
telecommunication infrastructure in the eleven provinces of Afghanistan.104 Besides
the restoration of TV hardware in Jalalabad,105 the country has set up a TV Studio, TV
Transmitter, a Mobile TV Satellite Uplink and five TV Relay Centres in
Afghanistan.106
3.7 Cultural Development and Cultural Exchanges
Taking into consideration their historical and cultural ties, both the nations are making
commendable efforts to strengthen their relationship through cultural exchanges. The
common cultural roots led them to share the classical musical traditions and now, the
musical groups of both the countries annually participate at the Nawroz festival in
Mazar-e- Sharif.107 Several Indian music festivals also witnessed Afghan musicians
participating and performing their local music as the music band of Afghanistan
‘Talaash’ (The Quest) performed at the SAARC Band Festival in New Delhi on 20th
of February 2009.108 For enhancing the cultural exchanges, India has set up an ‘Indian
Cultural Centre’ in her Embassy at Kabul with the support of Indian Council for
Cultural Relations (ICCR) in 2007.109 Besides it, the country has also set up the
‘India-Afghanistan Foundation’ in 2008 to foster the educational, cultural, scientific
and technical cooperation. Seminars/Conferences, exchange of scholars and
historians, translations & publication of books in Dari & Pashto languages, and
revival of a quarterly literary magazine the ‘Hind’ are among the major activities of
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India-Afghanistan Foundation.110 Besides the exchange of media persons, exchange
of radio & television programmes also took place between India and Afghanistan.111
The Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA) is looking for extensive coverage of
Afghan monuments in India.112 India has supplied musical instruments to the Afghan
Universities, music academies, Afghan Radio & Television as well as the Afghan
National Army Band.113
3.8 Strategic Partnership Agreement
India is one among the top five donors to Afghanistan. Since the signing of the
Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on 04th of October 2011, the country has
extended her assistance programme for all round development of the war torn
nation.114 The Agreement contributes to their developing bilateral relations.115 At the
time when the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) is packing to leave the
war torn country, this Agreement assumes greater significance. The two countries
have signed this first-ever agreement on strategic ties in October 2011116 on the
realization that the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) would not be
capable in handling the challenges of extremism and insurgency in post-2014
Afghanistan.117 The Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh hailing the
Agreement stated, “India will stand by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume
the responsibility for their governance and security after the withdrawal of international
forces in 2014”.118 The SPA has provided the space for the two nations to expand their
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11-12, November-December 2011, p.805
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relations from trade and economic cooperation, capacity development, socio-cultural
& civil society aspects to security dimension.119 The agreement directs them to
establish new institutional framework for political, security, trade and economic
cooperation.120 The implementation of the agreement will take place under the
framework of a Partnership Council headed by the Foreign Ministers of both the
nations.121 The Partnership Council will consist of separate Joint Working Groups on
Political & Security Consultations, Trade & Economic Cooperation, Capacity
Development & Education, and Social-Cultural-Civil Society & People-to-People
Relations involving high-level representatives from concerned ministries/
authorities.122
India, as a part of the Strategic Agreement, agrees to train ANSF in post-2014
Afghanistan.123 The vital features of this Agreement include defence cooperation,
fighting terrorism measures and training of the ANSF agreed by India.124 Thus, the
country will provide lethal and non-lethal weapons to Afghanistan.125 The agreement
provides a framework for cooperation in the area of national security, fight against
terrorism, drug trafficking and so on.126 It comprises General Principles; Political &
Security Cooperation; Trade & Economic Cooperation; Capacity Development &
Education; and Social, Cultural, Civil Society & People-to-People Relations;127 The
SPA also make explicit the trade and economic cooperation between India and
Afghanistan.128 In May 2012, Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Dr. Zalmai Rassoul
visited India to co-chair the inaugural session of the ‘India-Afghanistan Partnership
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Council’ with the then External Affairs Minister of India Mr. S. M. Krishna. The
Council has the mandate to implement the ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’.129
Thus, India has significantly contributed in the sectors identified as priority areas for
development by the Government of Afghanistan such as hydroelectricity, power
transmission lines, construction of roads, agriculture, industry, information,
broadcasting, education, health etc. The country remained at the forefront with her
sincere efforts to help the government and people of this war torn nation build a
stable, democratic and pluralistic society.130 The country has now agreed to assist and
train the ANSF to deal the security situation particularly in post-2014 Afghanistan.131
India has contributed massive efforts, many lives and countless resources in
reconstructing this nation. It is evident that most of her assistance aims at building
capacity and enhancing economic growth. All this reveals her firm commitment and
determination in strengthening ties with the war torn nation despite all the obstacles.
The achievements in bilateral relations are the result of regular high-level talks
between the respective Heads and other dignitary officials of both the
Governments.132
Besides it, India has maintained an Indian Air Force (IAF) base in Farkhor
(Tajikistan) only two kilometres away from the Afghan border, upgraded to a full-
fledged airbase in 2004 and completed in March 2007.133 The base is significant for
her efforts to promote stability in Afghanistan. The country has also contributed to the
reconstruction fund including support to the Afghan Government budget and the
World Bank managed ‘Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund’.134 The two nations are
also speculating over certain vital issues such as Joint Anti-Terrorism efforts, trade &
business, access to & development of Afghanistan’s natural resources, particularly oil,
129 For details see Annexure – XII
130 Tridib Chakraborti, “India’s Relations with South Asia in 2010: A Journey of Crests and Troughs”,
World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.516
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mining sectors and uranium.135 India has agreed to assist in developing trading routes
and exploring the natural resources as hydrocarbons and mineral ores in
Afghanistan.136 On one side, India is among the top five nations of the world who are
actively participating in the reconstructing Afghan nation and on the other side; India
is the third largest importer of Afghan goods.137 Regarding India, Rangin Dadfar
Spanta, the Afghan National Security Adviser, on his visit to India on 01st of
September 2010 said, “Nobody in Afghanistan would support reduction in Indian
engagement and its role in reconstruction and supporting capacity building in Afghanistan.
This is the desire of Afghan people”.138 India’s role and increased influence in this war
torn country has made even the Western Countries to confess that road to peace in
Afghanistan runs through New Delhi, besides Islamabad and Kabul.139 Afghan
Ambassador to India Mr. Nangyalai Tarzi speaking at the occasion of screening a
short film “Humsaye-Two Nations, Two Neighbours” on 02 October 2010,
appreciating India’s efforts in bringing normalcy in Afghanistan said, “India has stood
with Afghanistan in rebuilding their nation during the periods of war, misery and destruction.
One thing which I say as an Afghan, as a representative of the government, we are grateful
and we are thankful to India which stood with us rebuild our country”.140 The Prime
Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, at the 15th SAARC Summit in Colombo
stated as “India has an abiding commitment to Afghanistan’s efforts to build a democratic,
stable, prosperous and pluralistic polity. We will fulfil all our commitments to
Afghanistan”.141
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ayant Prasad, Special Secretary of Public Diplomacy Division of India’s Ministry
of External Affairs, at the occasion of screening a short film “Humsaye-Two
Nations, Two Neighbours” on 02nd October 2010 said, “India and Afghanistan share
common challenges. We live in an area….with terrorism and insurgencies and the biggest
challenge of all is that of nation building and bringing the fruits of development to the
common people. There are challenges and there are opportunities and we believe that if
Afghanistan does well, Afghans do well, that will equally be India’s success”.1 Afghanistan
is a legitimate sphere of influence for India.2 Whatever India is doing in this country
is mainly on humanitarian grounds. Besides promoting commercial relations, her
investments have been largely developmental.3 However, it does not mean that India
works only on moral grounds and has no calculation of realism. Perceiving her role
only to promote security and stability of the Afghan people is quite unrealistic.4 The
country is seeking to explore new opportunities in Afghanistan to address her foreign
policy aspirations. Thus, her Afghan Policy involves various strategic and vital
interests. However, there are some areas acting as constraints as well as posing threats
for her engagements with Afghanistan. Thus, it is significant to explore India’s
interests and challenges to pursue her foreign policy in Afghanistan.
4.1 India’s Interests in Afghanistan
Afghanistan holds the political and economic significance for India.5 India is working
for a stable, secure and prosperous neighbourhood and Afghanistan is a road for such
design. The country is helping Afghanistan to preserve security and strengthening
1 Tridib Chakraborti, “India’s Relations with South Asia in 2010: A Journey of Crests and Troughs”,
World Focus, Delhi, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.517
2 W. Raja, “The Complicated Tussle: Competing Interests of Regional Powers & Afghanistan’s
Neighbours”, Master of Defence Studies Research Project, Canadian Forces College, No. 38, p.29
3 Gautam Mukhopadhaya, “Afghanistan: Is a Regional Strategy viable in Afghanistan”, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C., 2010, pp.31-32
4 Nicholas Howenstein, Sumit Ganguly, “Pakistan & Afghanistan: Domestic Pressures and Regional
Threats: India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1,
2009, p.129
5 Arun Mohanty, “India, Russia in the post-Unipolar World”, World Focus, Delhi, Vol. XXXII, No.
11- 12, November-December, 2011, p.842
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strategic partnership.6 Thus, the country has considerable interests in Afghanistan.7
Taking into consideration the changing circumstances and the overall analysis of her
Afghan Policy aspirations, some vital interests are evident under the following
headings:
4.1 (a) Political and Economic Development of Afghanistan
The object of a democratic Afghanistan constitutes the base of ‘India’s Afghan
Policy’. The country wants the independent, united and peaceful Afghanistan capable
of standing on her own feet. The country has a strong security interest in ensuring that
this war torn nation remains a sovereign, stable, united and free from external
influence.8 The country wants to build her into a peaceful, secure and democratic
nation.9 A strong and stable civil government at Kabul is her interest. The country
also wants to boost the Afghan economy and has the market potential to stimulate
Afghan economy in several ways.10 Afghanistan too provides a space for her
companies currently engaged in the reconstruction process. This country has
repeatedly expressed her will to enhance Indian business while developing the
manufacturing hubs in different sectors as cement, oil, gas, electricity, banking,
communications etc.11 India’s efforts are to gain strong foothold in the South, West
and Central Asia by strengthening trade ties with Afghanistan.12 In order to avail these
opportunities, a democratic and a peaceful Afghanistan is a prerequisite.
4.1 (b) Energy Security and India’s Afghan Policy
India is set to become the third largest economy in the world. For sustaining and
achieving this objective, the country needs external energy resources to boost her
6 Kuldip Singh, “India, Central Asia and the Changing Contours of War on Terrorism”, World
Focus, Delhi, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December, 2011, p.824
7 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan”, World Focus, Delhi, Vol. XXXII,
No. 11-12, November-December, 2011, p.802
8 Latha A. Pandit, “India and Her Neighbours: Changing Perceptions”, World Focus, Delhi, Vol.
XXXII, No. 06, June 2011, p.342
9 Sayed Saleem Shahzad, “US Orchestrates Pakistan-India Talks,” Asia Today, September 30, 2009
10 Gautam Mukhopadhaya, “Afghanistan: Is a Regional Strategy viable in Afghanistan”, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington D. C., 2010, p.32
11 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Delhi,
Vol. XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December, 2008, p.417
12 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan”, World Focus, Delhi, Vol. XXXII,
No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.803
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economic growth.13 The growing population on one side and expanding economy on
the other side has increased her energy requirements, giving rise to the need for
energy resources. Energy security is a necessity to sustain her economic growth.14 The
country faces formidable challenges in meeting her energy needs,15 and does not have
the capacity to meet energy requirements from her domestic resources.16 Thus,
importing energy has become one of the important components of her foreign policy.
Securing long-term energy sources has priority in her policy designs since the rising
domestic demands, energy deficit and need to sustain a high economic growth rate.17
There is a strong recognition of the need for alternative energy sources among the
policy makers, taking into consideration the fact that the country imports 70% of oil
and 50% of gas in the total consumption.18 Her demand for energy has been growing
at a rapid rate as expected to increase from 122 million tonnes in 2001-02 to 364
million tonnes in 2024-25.19 This increasing demand suggests a comprehensive
relationship with Central Asian Republics (CARs).20 Afghanistan can act as a transit
route for energy supply from the Central Asian region. TAPI (Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline is the best example to justify the position of
Afghanistan for India’s energy security.21 Thus, a secure, peaceful and friendly
Afghanistan is mandatory for India to meet her energy requirements.
13 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December, 2011, p.778
14 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities: Economy Emerges as the Driving
Force”, World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.503
15 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “Central Asia – India’s Extended Neighbourhood”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 06, June 2011, p.372
16 Bhupendra Kumar Singh, “South Asia Energy Cooperation for Enhancing Cross Border Power
Trading”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December, 2011, p.763
17 Yashwant Sinha’s keynote address, as the External Affairs Minister of India, at the Third India-
Central Asia Conference, Tashkent, November 06, 2003, accessible at:
http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=53017303, (accessed on January 11, 2013, at 16:44)
18 Mohammed Badrul Alam, “Basic Parameters of India’s Foreign Policy and Its Resilience”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December, 2011, p.737
19 Talmiz Ahmed, “Oil Diplomacy for India’s Energy Security”, Atish Sinha, Madhup Mehta (Eds.),
Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, New Delhi, 2007, p.1093
20 Stephen Blank, “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia”, Comparative Strategy, No. 22, 2003,
p.148
21 Nirmala Joshi, “India, Central Asia and Afghanistan: Security and Economic Dimensions”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.554
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4.1 (c) Central Asia: India’s Extended Neighbourhood
Central Asia is an essential part of India’s ‘Extended Neighbourhood Policy’. Taking
into account the transnational nature of the threats and challenges in the region, the
South and Central Asia are interlinked. Central Asia not only connects Asia to
Europe, but also is rich in vital resources and has a strong consumer market.22 The
vast energy reserves in this region and the increasing energy requirements of world
nations since mid-1990s have made it attractive.23 The CARs have shown interest in
recent years to improve relations with Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.24
Besides the historical and cultural links, these republics are important for India taking
into account the common challenges they face as combating terrorism, enhancing
security and stability within the Central Asian region and curtailing drug trafficking.25
Both had a common cause to cooperate the US-led global war against terror as the
Republics, like India, were already the victims of terrorism or perceived themselves to
be targets in the future.26 These Republics have witnessed terrorism in the form of
various organizations including Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-
Tahrir (HT) and East Turkestan Islamic Movement ((ETIM) and these organizations
have links with international terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and Taliban.27 The
issue of energy has necessitated India’s quest for intensifying her relations with these
Republics. The region also provides overland routes for her to reach the resource rich
Russia and Middle East.28 Thus, India’s aspirations of becoming a global power on
one-side and meeting her energy requirements on the other side have placed the oil
and mineral rich CARs at the centre of her foreign policy designs. The Republics also
22 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities: Economy Emerges as the Driving
Force”, World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.505
23 Nirmala Joshi, “India, Central Asia and Afghanistan: Security and Economic Dimensions”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.552
24 Vinod Anand, “Multi-Directional Policies of Central Asian Nations and India”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December, 2008, p.449
25 Vinod Anand, “Multi-Directional Policies of Central Asian Nations and India”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December, 2008, p.451
26 Kuldip Singh, “India, Central Asia and the Changing Contours of War on Terrorism”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December, 2011, p.821
27 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “Central Asia – India’s Extended Neighbourhood”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 06, June 2011, p.376
28 Ibrokhim R. Mavlonov, “India’s Economic Diplomacy with Central Asian Nations - and the
Economic Development of the Region”, Dialogue, Vol. 07, No. 03, 2006, p.25
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provide market for her emerging export industries.29 With the establishment of a
hospital in Farkhor on the Afghan-Tajik border, construction of transmission line to
bring electricity from Uzbekistan and participation in developing the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project, India has explored new ways
to develop close links with the region.30 Thus India, since the last decade, is focusing
on engaging the CARs through a policy framework known as ‘Connect Central Asia
Policy’ (CCAP) and Afghanistan, perceived as a gateway to the energy-rich region,
holds strategic significance. In other words, “India’s Afghan Policy” is an essential
part of her “Connect Central Asia Policy”.
4.1 (d) Enhance Regional Ties via Afghanistan
India is keen to develop stronger economic relations and cooperation in the region on
trade, transit and energy. India has also acknowledged the need to promote regional
economic integration. Taking into consideration the geo-strategic position of
Afghanistan, her major policy framework is to rebuild this country as a land bridge
between the regions. The country is also keen to have a firm foothold and exercise
influence in the region along with other great powers to prevent any possible
influence hostile to her interests.31 In this regard, her Afghan Policy aims at increasing
her influence and reputation as a regional power.32 India’s regional agenda is
primarily focusing the reintegration of whole subcontinent in a single economic
zone.33 The primary concern of her ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘extended neighbourhood’
policy has been the stability and security of these nations.34 However, Afghanistan
acts as ‘a hub of instability’ in the South and Central Asian region.35 Thus, a peaceful
29 Ibrokhim R. Mavlonov, “India’s Economic Diplomacy with Central Asian Nations - and the
Economic Development of the Region”, Dialogue, Vol. 07, No. 03, 2006, p.25
30 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December, 2008, p.416
31 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “Central Asia – India’s Extended Neighbourhood”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 06, June 2011, p.373
32 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December, 2008, p.417
33 Mohammed Badrul Alam, “Basic Parameters of India’s Foreign Policy and Its Resilience”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December, 2011, p.740
34 Nirmala Joshi, “India, Central Asia and Afghanistan: Security and Economic Dimensions”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.554
35 Arun Mohanty, “India, Russia in the post-Unipolar World”, World Focus, Volume XXXII, No. 11-
12, November-December 2011, p.842
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and modernized Afghanistan is essential for India to build regional ties and economic
links.
4.1 (e) Create Alternative Routes to Reach the Central Asian Republics
India does not have direct access to the Central Asian region and is trying her best to
overcome this geographical barrier.36 The best option to reach Afghanistan and CARs
is via Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s refusal of granting transit rights to India and the
dynamism in Indo-Pak relations act as the greatest obstacle for her ‘Afghan Policy’
and ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’.37 However, the country has the realization as
observed by Frederick Starr, a renowned scholar on Eurasian Affairs, that “….the best
way is to pursue whatever options makes the best scene under the circumstances, if one
channel is blocked let trade flow through others. This process will encourage even force those
countries creating blockages to calculate the opportunity cost to themselves of their own
perspective”.38 The assistance to build Chah Bahar Port on the Makran coast in Iran
and Zarang-Delaram highway in Afghanistan provides India an alternative route for
connecting the resource rich region of Central Asia.39 The country has sought this
second best option to overcome the geographical barrier to reach this region. The
prospect of linking Iranian railway network with the Chah Bahar Port is underway.40
Such developments and constructions assist the country to reach the CARs while
cutting off Pakistan.41 Thus, with the purpose of accessing Afghanistan and Eurasia
and reducing the dependence of Afghanistan on Pakistan for trade and transit, India
has made investments in opening sea, road and rail links through Chahbahar Port of
Iran.42
36 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities: Economy Emerges as the Driving
Force”, World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.503
37 Nirmala Joshi, “India, Central Asia and Afghanistan: Security and Economic Dimensions”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.554
38 S. Frederick Starr, The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia, Washington
D.C., 2007, p.31
39 Kuldip Singh, “India, Central Asia and the Changing Contours of War on Terrorism”, World
Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December, 2011, p.822
40 Rajen Singh Laishram, “India’s Afghanistan Policy: Beyond Bilateralism”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 11-12, November-December 2011, p.777
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Neighbours”, Master of Defence Studies Research Project, Canadian Forces College, JCSP 38,
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4.1 (f) Contain Terrorism and Religious Extremism
India’s primary concern in the region is the security aspect and has an abiding interest
in containing and reversing the tide of religious fundamentalism and terrorism. The
spread of Islamic extremism is the main security threat43 and the main objective of
India’s Afghan Policy is to prevent the rise of radical Taliban. The country has been a
victim of various terror outfits such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen
(HM), Jaish-e-Mohammad etc.44 The country believes that the Kashmiri insurgents
have nexus with the Afghan militants.45 Her interest is to counter the increasing nexus
between the terrorist groups’ active in Af-Pak region.46 Her desire is to contain the
resurgence of Taliban and weed out all the elements from the Afghan soil that act
against her interests.47 In a realistic perspective, the links between the Taliban and
other radical groups operating in Pakistan would be hostile to her interests.48 India
counts that the rise of radical groups in Af-Pak may boost militancy in Kashmir
valley. The militant groups operating in Kashmir coordinate training, resource
allocation and logistical support with groups operating out of northwest Pakistan (i.e.
East Afghanistan).49 “As long as central control and legitimacy continues to elude in Kabul,
the conflagration in Kashmir will have a ready supply of tinder”.50 Thus, India has the
apprehension that any space for the radical and extremist elements in Kabul would
marginalize her influence as well as boost the internal disturbances in India. It is
under these security apprehensions that India is designing her Afghan policy to
combat terrorism and contain religious extremism.
43 Stephen Blank, “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia,” Taylor and Francis, 2003, pp.139-141
44 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “Central Asia – India’s Extended Neighbourhood”, World Focus, Vol.
XXXII, No. 06, June 2011, p.376
45 Arun Mohanty, “India, Russia in the post-Unipolar World”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-12,
November-December 2011, p.842
46 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities: Economy Emerges as the Driving
Force”, World Focus, Vol. XXXI, No. 11-12, November-December 2010, p.505
47 Mondira Dutta, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges”, World Focus, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11-12, November-December, 2008, p.417
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4.1 (g) Contain Drug Trafficking and Narco-Terrorism
Another concern for India is the production of opium in Afghanistan and drug
trafficking in the region. The southern provinces of Afghanistan concentrate eighty
percent of world’s opium production.51 The illegal trade of drugs in this country is a
major source for the terrorist groups to generate money52 and buy weaponry. Other
related concern with this opium production is the spread of drugs throughout the
region. Thus, fighting drug trafficking and Narco-terrorism forms a significant part of
India’s Afghan Policy.
4.1 (h) Maintain Presence in Afghanistan
India wants to consolidate her presence,53 as it is effective in preventing the “Islamic
(Extremist) Belt allied to Pakistan.54 The Strategic Agreement signed between the two
nations immediately after the US announcement of troop’s withdrawal justifies that
India does not want Kabul to fall prey to extremist Islamist ideology.55 For
maintaining her presence and securing a strong foothold, the country has to generate
support from the local population and the major aim of her Afghan Policy is to build
goodwill with the Afghan people.56 The country has succeeded in this respect with her
support in the infrastructure projects, capacity-building measures and skill
development programmes.57 Strategically, her presence in Afghanistan will also
reduce the dominance of China and the United States in Central as well as South
Asia.58
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4.2 Challenges for India’s Afghan Policy
It is evident from the above discourse that India has considerable interests in
Afghanistan. However, India’s Afghan policy is not free from obstacles. There are
various challenges ahead to promote her interests in Afghanistan. The changing
circumstances in the form of the US troop’s withdrawal up to 2014, resurgence of
Taliban, Pakistan factor, emerging China factor in Afghan affairs etc. have fuelled the
complex nature of challenges and the most significant among them are as following:
4.2 (a) Resurgence of Taliban
The Taliban insurgents have made a strong comeback with a new guerrilla strategy to
challenge the US-led coalition forces and as such, the death toll of the ISAF went up
five to six times since their resurgence.59 The US decision of NATO withdrawal at a
time when insurgency in Afghanistan is at climax is enough to describe that Taliban
has succeeded in transforming the US-led war to its advantage.60 The issues of
poverty, unemployment, disenfranchised peasants and helpless tribes make it easy for
the Taliban to exploit and recruit them for carrying the terrorist activities.61 The
backing of Pakistan as well as the overwhelming reliance on the Pashtun population
led Taliban success during 1990s, and these two factors are still relevant for
strengthening Taliban.62 The continued instability and resurgence of extremism in
Afghanistan do not augur well for India.63 Various analysts while describing the
attacks on Indians in Afghanistan as premeditated and specifically targeted take it as a
part of Taliban’s strategy to force her leave the country.64 The impact of the Taliban
resurgence on the regional and Pakistani extremist groups is also a major security
59 K Subrahmanya, “Afghanistan: The long Retreat of US”, Deccan Herald, November 25, 2012
60 Vishal Chandra, “India in the Afghan Maze: Search for Options”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No.
1, January 2011, p.120
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September 21, 2012, at 21:27
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concern for her.65 There are also doubts regarding the confinement of Taliban only to
Afghanistan if they return to power.
4.2 (b) Growing Nexus between the Terrorist Organizations
Afghanistan since long has been acting as a breeding ground for Islamic Militants, Al-
qaeda operatives, Haqqani networks, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban extremism.66
Besides the strong resurgence of Taliban, there are reports suggesting that it has
merged into horrific terrorist Haqqani network (a Pakistan-based terrorist outfit)
operating particularly in the southern and eastern Afghanistan. Lashkar-e-Taiba has
its own camps in Kunar that lies in the northeast Afghanistan.67 The Pentagon Press
Secretary, Mr. George Little, also acknowledged, "The Haqqanis are a group that….
pose a threat to ISAF forces in Afghanistan today. What Haqqani-related decisions are in a
post-2014 Afghanistan, I cannot say on this day in November 2012. I think it's a logical
question that would be surfaced in the review".68 Various Jihadi groups existent in
Pakistan have strengthened ties with the Taliban and al Qaeda, besides assimilating
the ambitions and methodology of al Qaeda.69 There is also a threat that some of these
groups are targeting the nuclear stockpile of Pakistan.70 The Af-Pak region since
1990s is famous for providing training and other logistical support to various militant
groups operating in Kashmir Valley like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen (HM).71 Militant activities in the Kashmir valley continues as in 2013 the
active militant groups carried out several deadly attacks on the military and civilian.
Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu & Kashmir, also witnessed some horrific
attacks during the same year. Since the Jammu & Kashmir Panchayat elections in
mid-2011, the militants have also killed many Sarpanches and Panches. The militant
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groups active in Kashmir receive continues support across the border in the form of
training, weaponry, money and shelter. Thus, the growing nexus between the terrorist
organizations on one side and the insurgency in Kashmir valley on the other side is an
utmost concern for India.
4.2 (c) Security of the Indian Workers in Afghanistan
The attacks on the Indian nationals and establishments pose another threat for India’s
interests in Afghanistan. The rising terrorist attacks in this war torn nation since 2006
has targeted India’s developmental projects killing several Indian personnel.72 These
attacks have made it difficult for India to execute her assistance projects. Some
attacks include an ambush killing two Indo-Tibetan Border Police personnel in
Nimroz province in January 2008, the attack on the Indian road construction team in
Minar area of Nimroz province killing two Indian engineers and injuring five others
on 12th of April 2008, and the kidnapping of an India citizen in Herat province,
working for Dubai-based HEB International Logistics.73 India faced the first terror
attack on her diplomatic mission abroad on 08th of July 2008 in the form of suicide
car bombing on her Kabul Embassy that killed 54 including two senior Indian
diplomats, Brig. Ravi Datt Mehta and IFS Officer V. Venkateswara, and two Indian
security personnel.74 The attacks on the Kabul Embassy followed by the 26/11
(Mumbai Attack) demonstrate the threat of terrorism for India.75 Indian Embassy
again targeted on October 08, 2009 cause death to 17 and injured 80, and the attack on
February 26, 2010 at Arya guesthouse in Kabul leads to the death of 09 Indians.76
Thus, the security of Indians working in Afghanistan is a matter of concern for India.
4.2 (d) State Sponsored Terrorism against India in Abroad
State sponsored terrorism is a major challenge for India. The country has repeatedly
convinced the international community in general and the US in particular about the
72 Mahesh Ranjan Debata, “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 11-
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‘ill designs of state sponsored terrorism in her neighbourhood and the security threats
emanating from there’.77 India suspects the involvement of Pakistan military in the
attacks against Indian consulates and Embassy in Afghanistan.78 As suggested by
various reports, India holds ISI responsible for planning and Haqqani Network for
carrying out these attacks.79 As admitted by Admiral Michael Mullen, in capacity of
the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in open Senate testimony, the terrorist
Haqqani Network was a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s ISI-Directorate.80 India, being
the victim of state sponsored terrorism at domestic level, now faces the same abroad
also. Thus, the menace of state sponsored terrorism challenges her foreign policy in
general and Afghan policy in particular.
4.2 (e) The United States Decision of NATO Withdrawal
The US decision of withdrawing the NATO forces from Afghanistan has put the
peace and reconstruction process in this war torn country in shuffles.81 India has
contributed a lot in rebuilding Afghanistan. However, all these efforts succeeded
because of the security provided by the US-led coalition forces.82 NATO exit will
adversely affect her projects and personnel in Afghanistan, as the ANSF is not in
capacity to handle and face the extremist insurgency.83 The resurgence of Taliban and
its increasing guerrilla warfare is enough to justify that Afghanistan is still dangerous
for the neighbouring countries and the regions adjacent to her.84 The US withdrawal
now raises the threat perception that the war torn nation will again become an
epicentre of terror. The 1990s style civil war is also possible in Afghanistan if the
international coalition forces left Afghanistan at this critical juncture.85 The US
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decision appears defective,86 as the outcome of NATO withdrawal with only half
work done in Afghanistan could be more dangerous than 1996 to 2001.
4.2 (f) Ambiguity in the United States Afghan Policy
India and USA, as against the early phase of post-9/11, witnessed divergence of
perceptions on Afghanistan issue in the current phase. The two have different
perceptions regarding certain issues including the relative threats posed by al Qaeda,
Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups active in Pakistan, the
reliability of Pakistan army to campaign with the US in tackling the Taliban,
Pakistan’s propaganda over India’s role in Afghanistan, and the issue of negotiations
with the Taliban.87 The US doublespeak has not provided any good sign for India.
Besides criticizing Pakistan for her links with terrorist groups and the presence of
Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad in Pakistan, the United States has not taken any
concrete action against her.88 The confusion over the commitments of West has put
India under suspicion regarding the US designs in the region. The London Conference
on Afghanistan in January 2010 to reach out the Taliban creates doubt regarding the
fulfilment of commitment by the US in the region.89 The ISI facilitated a meeting
between the US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and Haqqani family
members in Dubai in August 2011.90 The purpose of the meeting was to work out a
future arrangement in Kabul to accommodate Haqqani Network in some way.91 The
shift in the US Afghan policy to seek a possible political role for the Taliban could
add to uncertainties and instability of Afghanistan.
4.2 (g) The Process of Taliban Reconciliation
The reconciliation process to deal with Taliban for the future of Afghanistan is a
major challenge before India. With the backing of the United States, the Karzai
86 Vishal Chandra, “Growing Afghan Uncertainty and India’s Options”, World Focus, Vol. XXXII,
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government has started this process since the London Conference on Afghanistan held
in 2010. The basic aim of this policy is to engage Taliban to share power at Kabul.
However, the reconciliation process may lead towards severe consequences. For
India, the Taliban regime during 1990s proved against her interests and any future
arrangement of power sharing with Taliban does not have good sign for her. The
country perceives that the seizure of power by any faction of Taliban will provide safe
havens for terrorism in general and attacks on Indian projects and personnel in
particular.92
4.2 (h) Ambiguity in the Policies of Afghan Government
Another challenge for India’s Afghan Policy is the contradictory approach of the
Government of Afghanistan. On the one hand, Afghan government criticizes Pakistan
for supporting Taliban and on the other hand seeks Pakistan’s help to deal her internal
problems.93 Besides accusing Pakistan of fighting a proxy war within the Afghan
territory, the Afghan President did not hesitate to hail Pakistan as ‘twin brother’ and a
key for long-term peace in the region.94 Mr. Karzai delivering the Third RK Mishra
Memorial Lecture at New Delhi (organized by Observer research Foundation) said,
“Pakistan is a twin brother. India is a great friend. The agreement we (Afghanistan) signed
yesterday (04th of October 2011) with our friend (India) will not affect our brother”.95 The
efforts of the Washington and Kabul to frame out the future of Afghanistan and the
space they have provided for Islamabad in this process itself speaks of the
contradictory approach. This ambiguity in the Afghan policies is also a major
challenge before India’s Afghan Policy.
4.2 (i) Training and Equipping the ANSF
Since the US decision of ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan, the training of the
ANSF has become a question for all interested players in Afghanistan. The limited
and rushed training of the ANSF is not enough to face the challenge posed by the
92 Nalini Kant Jha, Sumit Kumar, “India’s Policy towards South Asian Neighbours: Constraints and
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Taliban insurgency. Thus, the other challenge for India’s Afghan Policy is to
transform the ANSF into real fighting force capable of facing the Taliban and al
Qaeda. India has agreed to train and support the ANSF to fight extremism and control
violence. However, such capacity of India has the limits taking into consideration the
susceptibility created by Pakistan among the world nations regarding her activities in
Afghanistan.
4.2 (j) Suspicion over India’s Presence in Afghanistan
The susceptibility of international community, particularly the regional players,
regarding India’s presence in Afghanistan as created by Pakistan’s sensitiveness poses
a serious challenge for her.96 There is also a perception that the hegemonic designs in
the region are driving India’s Afghan policy.97 There are also opinions from various
think tanks that the country has a design to control the land routes for Central Asian
resources leading to warm water ports with the perception to prevent both Pakistan
and China acting against her interests in the region.98 This susceptibility limits her
capacity to help Afghanistan become a secure, peaceful and democratic nation.99
Thus, it is a matter of concern for India to make the world community realize that her
interests in Afghanistan are not against any nation.
4.2 (k) China’s involvement in Afghanistan
China appears as a new competitor to India in Afghanistan. With the signing of a deal
with Afghanistan in May 2008, China has made the largest single foreign direct
investment in that country amounting to US$ 3.5 billion in the Aynak Copper field in
Logar province.100 On 16th of September 2011, her oil company ‘China National
Petroleum Corporation’ (CNPC) has won Afghanistan’s first oil field auction since
the US invasion. This will help her to secure energy resources as well as increase her
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presence in the war torn nation.101 China also committed to build a 400 MW Coal-
fired power plant, a freight railway running from Xinjiang through Tajikistan to
Afghanistan, a hospital and a Mosque.102 The country has already targeted India while
overreaching her in Southeast Asia and Central Asia and managed to establish a
strategic presence in India’s neighbourhood.103 Her presence in Afghanistan, thus, has
serious implications for India. Another related aspect with China Factor is the
growing Sino-Pak nexus. The post-Osama phase witnessed the US decision of troop’s
drawdown on one side and Sino-Pak cooperation on matters relating to counter-
terrorism as well as promoting stability & peace in Afghanistan on the other side.104
These changes have raised concerns for India about the nature of power relations in
the region.
4.2 (l) Lack of Direct Transit to Afghanistan and Obstacles via Iran
India has built a road from Zaranj to Delaram and assisted in Chah Bahar Port to
reduce the transit dependence on Pakistan. However, the attacks of Taliban also
prevent the movement of goods from this road.105 Besides it, the US is not happy with
India’s increasing engagements with Iran. Reaching Afghanistan and the Central
Asian Republics via Iran irritates the west. Iran too has reservations regarding India’s
closeness with the US. The US-Iran rift has put India in doldrums and it is a crucial
task and most difficult challenge for India to balance the USA and Iran.
4.3 Pakistan Factor in Indo-Afghan Relations
Pakistan is the primary rival of India in South Asia106 and a main challenge for her
Afghan Policy.107 The political, security and economic interests of the two rivals in
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Afghanistan largely deviate with each other. The strategic triangle of ‘India-Pakistan-
Afghanistan’ is evident with the observation that “Central aim for Pakistan’s military
tsars is to make sure that the future political make-up in Afghanistan does not allow India to
expand (her) security or even develop footprint”.108 Given the mistrust and discord
between the two, India’s presence in Afghanistan has created apprehensions within
Pakistan.109 The country seems antagonistic to the growing Indo-Afghan relations on
one side and India, Afghanistan and Iran on the other side.110 There is an
apprehension among the critics of India’s Afghan Policy in sustaining her presence in
Afghanistan taking into consideration the resurgence of Taliban, Pakistan’s comeback
in Afghan politics and Pakistan’s design to use Afghan territory against the interests
of India.111 Indo-Pak conflict did not remain confined to the traditional issues of
Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, but has moved to more complex issues including
economic battle, international-cum-regional status, intra & inter regional alliances
with diverge interests, expanding their areas of influence against each other, access to
the unexplored natural resources in the regions adjacent and so on. In this respect,
Central Asia, being a resource rich region and at close distance to India and Pakistan,
is also a matter of concern between the two.112 Regarding India’s presence in
Afghanistan, Pakistan perceives that her design is to marginalize Pakistan’s position
to become a strong partner of Central Asian resources.113 Thus, marginalizing India’s
influence in Afghanistan is vital for her strategic designs to prevent India from
reaching the Central Asia.114 Pakistan also comprehends that India perceives
Afghanistan as a geopolitical constraint on her.115 The country has the suspicion that
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India is encircling with the purpose to destabilize her,116 and takes it as the primary
motive of India to encircle her while establishing a strategic foothold in
Afghanistan.117 India’s presence in Afghanistan is irritating her in many respects,118
and the country has repeatedly expressed her concern in this regard.119 The country
has the perception that India uses her Consulates to encourage conflict in Baluchistan
and other provinces across the border.120 Thus, Pakistan takes every move of India in
Afghanistan hostile to her interests.121 The country considers the objective of India’s
support to the US-led war in Afghanistan not to end terrorism, but to destabilize
Pakistan.122 While building the hydropower projects on the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab
rivers, India has restricted the flow of waters to this country. Now, building 12
hydropower projects on the Kabul River are certainly going to have severe
consequences for Pakistan.123 Thus, from her perspective, India is looking to
undermine her political stability, territorial integrity and economic viability.124 Taking
into account the Strategic Agreement signed between India and Afghanistan, Pakistan
officials have expressed concerns with the suspicion that such kind of pact could harm
the long-term interests of the country in the region.125 India also wants, as the analysts
of Pakistan think, to maintain presence in Afghanistan with the motive to replace
Pakistan as the strategic ally of the United States.126 The policy makers of the country
also deny accepting the economic interests of India as of primary concern. They hold
that India, primarily, has strategic interests to counter-balance Pakistan’s support to
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the insurgency movement of Kashmir.127 The country also suspects that India’s
presence in Afghanistan aim at cultivating a diplomatic and intelligence network to
maintain a close watch over Pakistan.128
Pakistan since last few years has witnessed sudden increase of domestic violence in
the form of terrorist attacks and insurgency movements. India, being her main rival, is
the primary target to be accused and the country suspects that India supports the
insurgencies in Baluchistan and Waziristan.129 Her main justification for suspecting
India behind this instability is the perception that Pakistan is the only potential
country in the region to challenge the hegemonic tendencies of India, and is, thus,
likely to face severe security threats under the hands of India.130 The country projects
the Indian Consulates in Afghanistan working for India’s intelligence agency RAW
(Research and Analysis Wing),131 to supply money, arms and ammunition to the
insurgent groups in her tribal areas.132 Various think tanks also suggest that India’s
construction of Zaranj-Delaram highway on one side and dams on the Kabul River on
the other side aim at creating rift between Afghanistan and Pakistan.133
Pakistan has always seen Afghanistan as her backyard and a source of strategic depth.
During 1990s, only Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Pakistan recognised the Taliban
government in Afghanistan.134 The country has used Afghanistan against the interests
of India under the policy framework of ‘Strategic Depth’,135 and has designed her
Afghan strategy in accordance with the Indo-Pak conflict. The first objective of
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Pakistan is to prevent India’s influence in Afghanistan.136 The country again designs
her ‘Strategic Depth’ to limit India’s role and presence in a post-US Afghanistan.137
The Strategic Depth will enable her to use the Afghan territory, as previously done, to
organize and train terrorist groups against India to forge violence, particularly in
Jammu & Kashmir.138 Before the 9/11, Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan
were to formulate a durable peace with the pro-Pak government in Kabul, repatriate
the Afghan refugees from Pakistan, access the markets in Central Asia and explore a
safe route for the oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Arabian Sea.139
Following the event of 9/11, the country emerged out as a front line state and became
a trusted US ally in her war against Afghanistan.140 The Government of Pakistan
announced the end of support to the Taliban, immediately after the event of 9/11 and
provided all possible support to the international coalition forces in the form of
military bases and transit routes.141 Now, when the US has announced to drawdown
troops, Pakistan has the designs to map out the future arrangements in Afghanistan.
The long-standing objective of this country in Afghanistan has been to establish a
friendly government.142 The Pak perception regarding the Taliban controlled
Afghanistan is two-folded. First, Taliban in power at Kabul would be more
comfortable for Pakistan’s Strategic Depth. Second, New Delhi would have no
influence over the Taliban.143 Since the idea of Afghan President Mr. Hamid Karzai in
2010 to induct Taliban into the government, Pakistan is trying hard to bring Haqqani
Network into the negotiating table.144 Assessing that US is not capable of handling the
Afghan war properly; the Pak Army shows the interest for the workable exit strategy
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to set the deal with Taliban.145 The country takes the resurgence of Taliban as an
advantage to win the international community’s assurance, particularly the United
States that Pakistan is all time frontline state in the Afghan affairs.146 Her interest is
that the security situation in Pakistan will become better if reconciliation between
Afghanistan and Haqqani group take place. It is now clear that the country has the
interest of including Haqqani Network and Taliban to share power at Kabul.147 Her
role in the Afghan national reconciliation process poses another challenge for India.148
India fears that such role would allow her Strategic Depth to play again against the
interests of India.149 With the return of Pakistan in the Afghan politics, the
compulsions for India’s Afghan Policy have grown up.150
The newly elected Obama administration in 2009 focused to redraw the map to
include the tribal regions of western Pakistan as the part of war in Afghanistan.151
After the meeting of President Obama with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and
Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, General James Jones (US National Security
Adviser) put it in a press briefing that “We have several countries, but we have one
theatre”.152 Thus, the Obama administration introduced the term “AfPak” with the
realization that Pakistan has equal priority to deal with the terrorist groups and
achieve success in Afghanistan.153 However, Pakistan continues to provide shelter to
various extremist groups, and has done nothing effectively in this regard instead of
tremendous pressure from international community.154 A number of terrorist groups
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still receive support, training and funds from Pakistan.155 India has repeatedly asked
the international community to pressurize the country to curb terrorism operating
from her soil.156 The Taliban and al Qaeda mainly operate across the southern
Afghanistan in the tribal areas of Pakistan and this is in principle responsible for the
United States to order unmanned Drone attacks on these hideouts in Pakistan.157 US
officials and intelligence reports repeatedly attribute the Taliban resurgence and
growing strength of al Qaeda to the safe havens of Af-Pak region.158 Today, the
insurgencies of Taliban and al Qaeda are equally active in AfPak.159 Pakistan has
repeatedly supported the insurgency movements within the territory of India. Besides
it, India has faced various attacks fuelled by this country. Being the victim of state
sponsored terrorism at domestic level since 1990s; India is now facing the same in
abroad. This has become evident with the attacks killing the Indians workers and
targeting her official establishments in Afghanistan. Various international reports
suggest that Pakistan’s spy agency ISI might be behind these attacks.160 The security
threat perception of India is looming large with the growing suspicion of international
community on the links between the terrorist groups and Pakistan’s ISI.161 There are
also expert suggestions that view ISI’s hand in the killing of the former President of
Afghanistan and the head of the High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani, in
September 2011.162 Thus, taking into account the strategic designs of Pakistan within
the region, India is not at ease with her direct involvement in the process of
reintegration and reconciliation of Taliban in Afghanistan,163 and containing Pakistan
from playing such proxies is a crucial challenge for India’s Afghan Policy. Besides it,
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Pakistan being the crucial land link between India and Central Asia acts as a barrier164
and hinders the trade relations165 while refusing to provide transit rights.166
Afghanistan is largely dependent on Pakistan for all of her major imports. Currently,
the Gwadar and Karachi Ports in Pakistan deal large amount of her trade167 and
Pakistan wants to retain her hegemony over it.168 Thus, a potential alternative route to
connect Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics via Iran, reducing dependence
of international community on Pakistan, is a threat to the central position of that
country in the Afghan conflict.169
There is a general perception that India and Pakistan are competing for strategic gains
in Afghanistan that now acts as a battleground between the two.170 India’s efforts to
expand the bilateral relations with Afghanistan, as evident with the signing of the
Strategic Partnership Agreement171, witnessed hostile reactions172 as well as caused
distrust within Pakistan.173 However, India claims that her interests in Afghanistan
extend beyond the Pakistan factor174 and her desire is to increase trade and enhance
new energy ties with both Central and West Asia and Afghanistan provides a most
suitable route for this.175 India has also repeatedly shown her interest to sustain the
process of composite dialogue with Pakistan. This is evident with the fact that the
country has initiated several measures to encourage peaceful relations and build trust
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with Pakistan. The most notable initiative is the current focus to enhance trade ties. A
number of experts and institutions including the World Bank have supported the
liberalization of trade between the two nations176 and over the past years, some
developments took place to resume trade relations.177 In November 2011, Pakistan
announced to grant ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status to India.178 Pakistan’s former
Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar while speaking in the National assembly of
Pakistan on 13th of October 2011 stated, “Pakistan has decided in principle to grant
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India”.179 The decision to confer ‘Most
Favoured Nation’ status to India by replacing a positive trade list to a negative trade
list of about 200 items is enough to describe the realization of enhancing bilateral
trade and commerce.180 In February 2012, the historic visit to Pakistan by the
Commerce Minister of India Mr. Anand Sharma, with a delegation of over 100 Indian
business leaders to discuss ways to deepen trade relations, marked another important
step in normalizing trade relations with the signing of three agreements on customs
cooperation.181 Thus, the two nations have to realize the common concerns and issues
that require a joint mechanism to address. The US President Barak Obama in
Washington said that he want Pakistan to realize that a peaceful relation with India is
in the best interest of the whole region.182 Talking about the US intention in Af-Pak
region, President Obama stated, “Part of what we want…. is actually get Pakistan to
realize that a peaceful approach towards India would be in everybody’s interests”.183
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ince 9/11, India has played an influential role in the development and stability of
Afghanistan. For this, the country is doing enough with the ongoing efforts of
building institutions, developing businesses & human capital, and enhancing the
capacity of Afghanistan to provide security and welfare to her citizens. The country
has always prioritized the requirements and demands of the Afghan people. The focus
of her assistance remained on the economic development of this war torn nation.
Thus, her basic aim is the economic empowerment of Afghanistan. India’s
investments and the valuable role in promoting commercial relations with this country
have directed the foreign policies of the world nations to make Afghanistan’s
economy a self-reliant and not aid-dependent.
India has an ambition of becoming a developed state and for this purpose, India
follows the ‘economy first’ strategy. Thus, “Connect Central Asia Policy” is a part of
India’s economic diplomacy, and India’s “Afghan Policy” forms the significant part
of “Connect Central Asia Policy”. It is because of Afghanistan having the significance
of providing strong link for India with the CARs. As a part of India’s desire to
increase trade and enhance new energy ties with Central Asia and Middle East,
Afghanistan provides a most suitable space to achieve this objective. It is under such
aspiration that the country places Afghanistan at the centre of her economic
diplomacy. The country’s interest is to rebuild Afghanistan as a cross-connection and
transit route between the regions adjacent. For this purpose, the country has
contributed US $ 2 billion to develop a democratic, peaceful, stable and self-reliant
Afghanistan. The minerals, hydrocarbons and developing human capital in
Afghanistan, besides the geo-centric position between the South, Central, West and
East Asia justifies her potential to drive the regional economic growth. India has an
abiding interest to develop stronger economic relations and cooperation in the region
on trade, transit and energy via this country. With her role in bridging the gap
between Afghanistan and the Central Asia while making the former as an emerging
market for the resources of the latter, India has developed close links with the CARs.
Thus, the country aims at increasing her influence in South and Central Asia to reach
Afghanistan as well as the resource-rich CARs.
S
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The mineral resources and business-cum-investment opportunities in Afghanistan are
significant contributors to encourage the regional countries to avail mutual benefits.
However, there are some intense but common threats to all of them such as terrorism,
religious extremism, nexus between terrorist organizations, illegal weapons and drug
trafficking that demands collective action to prevent their spread and affect over the
whole region. Taking into consideration the threat of non-traditional notions of
security in the region, India wants to prevent the return of extremist Taliban to power
in Kabul as well as to cut-off the chain between the Taliban and other terrorist groups
operative in the adjacent countries, particularly Pakistan. The country also has the
interest to prevent the spread of religious extremism in the region. Her basic aim is to
promote peace and security in the region as well as prevent her own territory from the
terrorist provocations. The insurgency movement in the Kashmir valley, though
marginalized since last few years, is prone to violence. In this regard, any sort of
space, support or provocation may hamper the infant peace and development process
in this part of India.
India’s presence in Afghanistan also aims at managing the strategic challenge posed
by Pakistan. Pakistan acts as a geographical barrier as well as the ideological
constraint to hamper the moderate Indo-Afghan relations. The flexible approach of
Pakistan towards the safe havens of terrorists in her soil endangers the whole region in
general, and Afghanistan and India in particular. The country also aims at defaming
India’s influence in Afghanistan as well as among the world nations while projecting
her presence in Afghanistan as a strategic design to encircle Pakistan. The country
also suspects India’s hand in the violence and insurgency movements within her
territory, particularly in Baluchistan and Waziristan. However, such projections
regarding India’s presence and activities in Afghanistan did not match the actual role
the country plays in the war torn nation. It is a matter of concern for everyone that
Pakistan is facing extreme violence under the hands of terrorist groups, but her past
role of providing safe havens to these groups is more responsible for this instead of
the provocation under any external influence. Instead, there are reports about ISI’s
hand in the attacks against the Indian workers and official establishments in
Afghanistan. Pakistan continues her policy to breed and support terrorism against
India. The country also has the designs for the future of Afghanistan as an outcome of
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her Strategic Depth. Thus, India has concerns vis-à-vis her role in mapping out the
future of Afghanistan. Further, with the perception to meet her energy requirements in
Central Asia and under the provocation by Pakistan while acting as a barrier between
her and Afghanistan, India has developed an alternative route via Iran to delink Indo-
Afghan relations dependence on Pakistan. Thus, the economic dimension of India’s
‘Afghan Policy’ is independent of Pakistan Factor, while the security dimension of
India’s ‘Afghan Policy’ has the concern with ‘Pakistan’s Afghan Strategy’.
Taliban resurgence is a good sign neither for the regions adjacent nor for the whole
world community. Instead, it has raised security concerns for Afghanistan, Pakistan,
China, the Central Asian Republics, Iran as well as India. The NATO exit is a matter
of concern for India as they are leaving at a stage when the Taliban insurgency is at
peaks. The situation in Afghanistan has not improved up to the levels of expectation
and the government there with weak security forces is not in capacity to prevent the
country from again becoming a breeding house of terrorism. There are frameworks
designed by the nation-state actors, including India, to train and equip the ANSF.
However, the effectiveness and credibility of the Afghan forces is a matter of concern
for every nation.
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Suggestions
After deep analysis, thorough discussions and generous scrutiny of the developing
Indo-Afghan relations since 9/11, following suggestions came out of the study. The
suggestions aim at influencing the policy-making in India to guide and map out future
strategy for India’s ‘Afghan Policy’. The suggestions are largely concerned with the
changing circumstances and India’s engagements with the post-2014 Afghanistan.
1. Proactive Role via both Soft Line Strategy (SLS) & Hard Line Strategy
(HLS)
India has to refrain from ‘Doing Nothing’ or ‘Wait & Watch’ policies, as they will put
her at the position of a poor bystander. The country has to take a bold and proactive
stand in the Afghan issue to work for peace and protect her interests. For this, there
are two choices to adopt in her approach i.e. the Soft Line Strategy (SLS) and the
Hard Line Strategy (HLS). SLS includes the activities to win goodwill of the Afghan
people, influence the Afghan people in culture, society, polity etc. HLS includes the
influence in power sharing in Afghanistan, extension of paramilitary forces in
Afghanistan, training and equipping the security forces of Afghanistan with modern
war tactics, weaponry etc. The changing circumstances in Afghanistan demands India
to mix some selective elements of ‘HLS’ with the existing ‘SLS’ to make the
international community felt her presence and significant role in stabilizing
Afghanistan.
2. Inclusive Approach to Train the ANSF
The US drawdown will provide an opportunity for the regional countries to train and
equip the security forces of Afghanistan as the ANSF is not in a position to substitute
ISAF. India has to support the development of the Afghan security forces to face the
challenges ahead in Afghanistan. The security of Indian’s interests, projects and
personnel working in Afghanistan, the threat of Taliban to recapture power and the
NATO pull out could necessitate an expanded paramilitary presence. The country has
already agreed for the same with the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement.
However, India has to refrain from unilateral approach in this regard, as it will
provide space for the provoking agencies to encourage the terrorists more and more
against her. Any effort of military intervention or training of Afghan security forces
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must be inclusive. In other words, the country has to focus the multi-lateral and
refrain from the unilateral military intervention in Afghanistan. Thus, India has to
work for engaging the regional and international actors, particularly the US, Russia
and China, in supporting the cause.
3. Focus the Institutional Approach to Stabilize Afghanistan
India has to direct the international community strategically towards Afghanistan
stability through UN mediation and peacekeeping. The country can also work for a
UN-SAARC Joint Mission to stabilize Afghanistan. There is also an option to use the
cover of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) to progress her
political initiative to achieve the objective of Afghan stabilization. India can also
focus the UN-SAARC Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan (USPMA) to help the
ANSF in combating insurgency in the war torn nation. There is a space to enhance the
role of regional organizations such as SAARC and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation
Organization) in mapping out collective strategies to address the Afghan issue.
4. Coalition Structure: A Bilateral & Multi-Lateral Mechanism
Taking into consideration the current situation in Afghanistan, no alone country can
do wonders. India has to acknowledge the significance of collective efforts to stabilize
Afghanistan. For this, the country has to work for an inclusive approach to help
Afghan stability and prosperity. Thus, multilateralism and regionalism must guide her
Afghan Policy in future. The country can engage the intra-regional, inter-regional and
extra-regional actors in various bilateral and multi-lateral mechanisms while
exploiting the common security and economic concerns. The collective efforts to
bring peace in Afghanistan and in the whole region demands a coalition structure of
the world nation-actors. India has to provide a platform and work for establishing
such a coalition structure. However, taking into consideration the diverse interests and
suspicion among few regional countries, India can apply the coalition structural
strategy in two phases. In a short-term phase, a coalition structure besides India must
include the willing and credible international actors as USA, Russia, Central Asian
Republics and Iran. The long-term phase, besides these actors, requires a coalition
structure including Pakistan, China and other willing actors.
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5. Focus on Regional Approach to Stabilize Afghanistan
The prospect of peace and stability in Afghanistan is not possible without the
cooperation of her neighbours. There is a need for greater emphasis on the regional
approach. The essential regional players include Pakistan, India, Iran, the Central
Asian States, China and Russia. India has to ensure a strong, Afghan-centric and more
inclusive regional approach. India, as a part of her economic diplomacy, must foster
energy investments and promote regional trade across the South, West, Central and
East Asia via Afghanistan. This will benefit India in many respects while providing
her space to maintain foothold in Afghanistan, access the energy resources of Central
Asia and check the elements antithetical to her interests. Her ‘Afghan Policy’ and
‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ requires being more accommodative with the changing
circumstances in order to achieve the long-term objectives of energy security and
combating terrorism. A regional approach is the main requirement, whether the
international forces stay or leave Afghanistan, to execute multilateral strategies to
address the problems Afghanistan is facing. The peace and stability in this country is
not possible without the wholehearted cooperation of the region, particularly the
countries having direct geographical linkage with Afghanistan. Thus, India has to
encourage all these countries to cooperate in her Afghan mission while working out a
strategy to accommodate the interests of these countries in Afghanistan.
6. Utilize Pipeline Politics
Trade & Pipe-line politics is a better option for addressing both the economic and
security aspects of the region. India has to utilize this option aptly in generating the
cooperation of the regional countries. This will make the process to achieve her
objectives in Afghanistan easy.
7. Cooperation-cum-Containment Policy to Address Pakistan Factor
India’s Afghan Policy will depend inevitably on Pakistan factor. India has three
choices to deal the Pakistan factor in her relations with Afghanistan i.e. Isolation,
Cooperation and Containment. ‘Isolation’ means the country has to move back and
close her consulates and other projects in Afghanistan. ‘Cooperation’ advocates that
the country have to seek mutual interests and persuade Pakistan to cooperate in her
Afghan Mission. ‘Containment’ refers to the reactionary policy to prevent Pakistan
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from harming her interests in Afghanistan. However, taking into consideration the
geographical and strategic significance of Pakistan in the Afghan issue, India has to
deal cautiously with Pakistan. For this, the best option is the Cooperation-cum-
Containment Policy. This implies cooperation with Pakistan for the development,
stabilization and democratization of Afghanistan as well as to contain Pakistan
playing proxies to marginalize India’s influence and use Afghan territory against her
interests.
Beside it, the country has to focus the cooperation of the international community and
all regional players to persuade Pakistan to address the Taliban and other terrorist
groups operating on her territory with dedication and honesty and expose the
provoking & sheltering agencies of the terrorist organizations operating from her soil.
Nevertheless, India has to reorient her peace strategy with Pakistan while making the
Afghan issue as its significant aspect. The country also requires a cautious approach
to prevent any design of Pakistan to establish a regime in Afghanistan unfriendly to
India. Lastly, the country has to ensure others that the Pak-projected security concerns
vis-à-vis her presence in Afghanistan is meaningless and misleading.
8. Encourage Pakistan & Refrain from Activities Harming Pakistan’s Interests
Regarding the Pakistan factor in Indo-Afghan relations, India has to refrain from the
activities that may harm the interests of Pakistan. In this regard, the country has to
remain cautious while building constructions and dams on the rivers in Afghanistan
that flow to Pakistan. The country also needs to seek and explore mutual interests and
benefits to encourage the Government of Pakistan provide cooperation to work for
peace, stability, development and prosperity of the region in general and Afghanistan
in particular.
9. Keep Afghanistan out of Indo-Pak Conflict
In order to keep the Indo-Pak conflict out of the Afghan issue, there is a primary
requirement of a trilateral agreement between India-Pakistan-Afghanistan to prevent
Afghanistan from becoming another area of dispute between the two giants of South
Asia.
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10. Focus Iran Policy
India has a geographical constraint in reaching Afghanistan. Taking into consideration
the dynamic nature of Indo-Pak relations, India has to engage Iran passionately in
addressing this problem. Thus, her Afghan Policy requires focusing Iran as a viable
option to disengage her dependence on Pakistan to reach Afghanistan and Central
Asia. Iran has the potential not only to overcome this geographical barrier, but also to
contain the emerging Sunni Islamic extremist belt throughout the region. Besides it,
Iran is also a viable option to check the Taliban rule in Afghanistan as it shares direct
border with Afghanistan and has the common concern with India regarding the Sunni
Islamic extremist group ruling Afghanistan. As per the energy requirements of India,
a policy to engage Iran and Central Asian Republics will serve her interests better.
11. Support the Kabul-led Reconciliation Process with Pre-conditions
India has to support the efforts of the Afghan government to integrate Taliban in the
peace-process and cooperate in the experiment of reconciling Taliban while
persuading them to change the extremist character. The country can go a step forward
and offer her assistance in the rehabilitation of surrendered insurgents. However,
India has to emphasize the international community, particularly the US, and the
Government of Afghanistan to ensure Taliban’s acceptance of the existing
Constitution of Afghanistan, cut off all links with all extremist groups in the region
and work strictly under the democratic principles. Among the preconditions, the
country must focus strictly the assurance of the moderate-Taliban not to allow any
terrorist organization operate from the territory of Afghanistan.
12. Continue the Selfless Approach in Developing Afghanistan
In order to sustain her presence and challenge the disturbing elements, India has to
continue her reconstruction assistance, capacity building, human capital development
and other developmental projects in Afghanistan with more focus on her ‘local
ownership’ policy and ‘selfless approach’.
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13. Focus the Comprehensive Security Development of Afghanistan
Besides the state security in Afghanistan, there is a need to address human security
and freedom from fear & want. India has to guide her future Afghan policy in the
direction to ensure comprehensive security in Afghanistan.
14. Multi-Track Diplomacy to Engage Afghanistan
India also has to utilize multi-track diplomacies while encouraging the high level
official visits between the two nations, encouraging the private business sectors of
India to invest in Afghanistan, enhance people-to-people contacts etc.
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Annexure – I
Summary of MOUs signed by India and Afghanistan during the Visit of
President Karzai to India
February 24, 2005
1. Following two MOUs were signed during the visit of President Karzai.
i) MOU on cooperation in the field of civil aviation
ii) MOU on cooperation in the field of media and information
2. MOU on cooperation in the field of civil aviation is aimed at building capacity and
strengthening institutional structure of Afghanistan’s civil aviation sector. This would
include training in areas of airport management, air traffic control, navigational aids
etc, including safety and maintenance of aircrafts.
3. MOU on cooperation in the field of media and information calls for greater
interaction between the media persons and radio and TV organizations of the two
countries. Under India’s assistance programme, Government of India has completed
the work on TV Satellite uplink at Kabul and downlink at 10 provincial capitals in
Afghanistan, which are already operational. Work has commenced on
restoration/augmentation of TV hardware in Jalalabad and Nangarhar province. India
will be taking up the next phase of augmentation of TV coverage though additional
satellite uplinks and downlinks.
New Delhi
February 24, 20051
1 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=53059045, (accessed on November 07, 2011, at 17:37)
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Annexure – II
India-Afghanistan Joint Statement during the visit of Dr. Manmohan Singh to
Afghanistan
August 28, 2005
During the visit, the two leaders held talks on a broad range of bilateral issues as well
as regional and international issues of common concern. They expressed satisfaction
at the progress in bilateral relations since President Hamid Karzai’s visit to India (23-
25 February, 2005) and agreed to take this relationship into a new stage of
partnership.
India remains fully supportive to the goal of a sovereign, stable, democratic and
prosperous Afghanistan. Both leaders agreed that such an Afghanistan is also
necessary for peace, security and stability in the region. The two leaders condemned
global terrorism as threat to democracy and declared that there can be no compromise
with those who resort to terrorism. They reiterated their commitment to work together
to ensure that Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorism and
extremism.
India has admired the courageous steps taken by the Afghan Government and the
people, under the leadership of President Hamid Karzai, towards the restoration of
peace and the adoption of a democratic polity while addressing the challenge of
economic development and reconstruction.
In the presence of Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and President Hamid Karzai,
bilateral cooperation agreements in the areas of Agriculture and Health were signed.
A new initiative on ‘Small Development Projects’ has been launched to work with
local communities in development programmes. Following on a pilot project
undertaken by the Confederation of Indian Industry in pursuance to President Karzai’s
visit to India earlier this year, the two Governments agreed to launch a “Skill Building
Initiative” in Afghanistan in partnership with the Confederation of Indian Industry
and the United Nations. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh announced that India
will adopt 100 villages in Afghanistan to promote integrated rural development by
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introducing solar electrification and rain water harvesting using technologies that have
been developed and successfully demonstrated in India. While announcing a gift of
1000 sewing machine to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, it was agreed that India
would assist in establishing a Women’s Vocational Training Centre in Kabul.
Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh welcomed President Hamid Karzai’s suggestion
to make greater use of Indian institutions for training of Afghans. In order to
accelerate the human resource development process, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan
Singh announced 500 scholarships for Afghan students for university education and in
addition, 500 short-term training fellowships under the ITEC programme for Afghan
men and women. A symbol of long-standing cooperation between the two countries in
the field of education is the 102-year old Habibia School which was destroyed in the
war and after it’s rebuilding by India, will be jointly inaugurated by Prime Minister
Dr. Manmohan Singh and President Hamid Karzai later today.
To support Afghanistan’s steps towards democracy, both countries will expand their
cooperation in building of democratic institutions, infrastructure and human capacity.
India has dedicated training programmes for Afghanistan officials. Baba-e-Millat His
Majesty Mohammad Zabir Shah laid the foundation stone of the new Parliament
Building in the presence of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and President
Hamid Karzai at Daral Aman.
President Hamid Karzai shared his vision of restoring Afghanistan’s historical rule as
a land bridge between Central Asia and Indian sub-continent and the initiatives taken
by rebuilding its road network. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh endorsed this
vision as an important step for promoting regional cooperation by encouraging, both
trade and people-to-people contact among the countries of the region.
The two leaders reaffirmed that Afghanistan and India have a common interest in
reinvigorating the past ties and developing a new partnership for the 21st century.
Kabul
August 28, 20052
2 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530510092, (accessed on November 07, 2011, at 17:24)
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Annexure – III
Summary of MoUs signed by India and Afghanistan during the State Visit of
President Hamid Karzai to India
April 10, 2006
Three MoUs were signed between India and Afghanistan on April 10, 2006 in
presence of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and President Hamid Karzai of
Afghanistan. The summary of the three MoUs are given below:
1) MoU on cooperation in the field of education was signed between Shri Arjun
Singh, Minister of Human Resource Development and Dr Abdullah Abdullah,
Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, on behalf of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Higher
Education. The MoU will encourage the development of contacts and cooperation
between the educational institutions of the two Governments, based on their
respective academic and educational needs. In addition, there will be: a) exchange
of research materials, publications, educational literature and teaching aids; b)
organization of training programmes for educational administrators and teachers;
c) exchange of scholars, teachers, academic, experts and students; d) twinning
arrangements between institutions of higher learning; e) setting up of chairs on
contemporary studies, or any other mutually agreed subject; f) development of
programmes between institutions of technical, vocational and higher education;
and g) mutual assistance in the fields of Information Technology and Computer
Science
2) MoU in the field of Rural Development was signed by Dr. Raghuvansh Prasad
Singh, Minister of Rural Development and Mr Mohammad Hanif Atmar,
Afghanistan’s Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. The MoU will
encourage, develop and strengthen technical cooperation between the two
countries in the field of rural development, including, development and
maintenance of rural access and connectivity; rural water supply and sanitation
and village-based irrigation schemes; generation of wage and self-employment
opportunities for the rural poor; development of rural infrastructure using the
wage employment programme; and sector-specific human resource development,
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including assistance in setting up of a dedicated institution for rural development
in Afghanistan. The MoU will be implemented through a biennial Work Plans that
will be developed jointly.
3) MoU on cooperation in the field of Standardization was signed between Shri
Svayam Prakash Sharma, Director General, Bureau of Indian Standards and Mr
Abdul Hai Khurasani, Charged’ Affaires of Embassy of Afghanistan in New
Delhi. This MoU calls for co-operation in the field of standardisation by
enhancing and strengthening technical cooperation in the fields of standardization,
certification, testing, measurement and quality assurance systems with the aim of
exchange of necessary information and expertise between the Bureau of Indian
Standards and Afghanistan National Standardisation Authority. The two parties
will jointly develop an Annual Action Plan.
New Delhi
April 10, 20063
3 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530511222, (accessed on November 07, 2011, at 17:02)
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Annexure - IV
India-Afghanistan Joint Statement, State Visit of President Hamid Karzai to
India
April 10, 2006
During the visit, the two leaders held talks on a wide-range of bilateral issues as well
as regional and international matters of common interest. They affirmed that the time-
tested friendly relationship between the two countries, underpinned by historical and
cultural ties, had overcome many challenges and were today based on a shared
commitment to the ideals of democracy, peace and security.
To broaden cooperation between the two countries, three cooperation agreements
were signed in the areas of Rural Development, Education and Standardization in the
presence of President Karzai and Prime Minister Singh.
Going beyond the core areas of government-to-government developmental
cooperation, both leaders also explored the possibilities of expanding business-to-
business cooperation, particularly between the small and medium entrepreneurs of the
two countries. President Karzai is also accompanied by a strong business delegation
on this visit, which will be interacting with Indian business and industry counterparts
from CII, FICCI and ASSOCHAM this afternoon. Prime Minister Dr Manmohan
Singh offered to consider extending a US $ 50 million Line of Credit facility to
promote trade and investment between the two countries.
As provided for under Article 11 of the Preferential Trade Agreement signed between
the two countries on March 6, 2003, the two sides agreed to constitute a Joint
Committee at Ministerial level to review the progress in the implementation of the
Agreement, thereby promoting mutually beneficial bilateral trade.
At the regional level, the two leaders reiterated their vision of Afghanistan regaining
its strategic position at the cross roads of Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent.
The need for greater regional cooperation by encouraging trade and people-to-people
contact among the countries of the region was emphasized. President Karzai thanked
Prime Minister Dr. Singh for India’s strong support for Afghanistan’s membership of
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SAARC and pledged to work together with the member countries in all fields to effect
greater harmonization of political, economic, social and security policies.
President Karzai welcomed that India would host the Second Regional Economic
Cooperation Conference for Afghanistan in New Delhi, November 18-19, 2006, with
participation of all the regional countries, G-8 member States and international
organizations. This Conference will also have a business-to-business component to
promote private sector linkages.
Confronting the shared challenges of fundamentalism and terrorism, the two leaders
condemned global terrorism as a threat to democracy and declared that there can be
no compromise with its perpetrators. India expressed its support to the efforts made
by Afghanistan in recent months in tackling the increased terrorist activities in certain
provinces in the country.
The two leaders emphasized the importance of regular high-level exchanges between
the two countries for taking this partnership to greater heights.
New Delhi
April 10, 20064
4 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530511223, (accessed on November 07, 2011, at 18:07)
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Annexure – V
India-Afghanistan Joint Statement during State Visit of President Hamid Karzai
to India
August 04, 2008
India reiterated its full support to the goal of a sovereign, democratic, peaceful and
prosperous Afghanistan, conducive to the peace, security and stability of the region.
President Karzai’s visit comes at a time when there has been a resurgence of terrorism
whose specter profoundly threatens our societies. The attack on the Indian Embassy in
Kabul on the 7th of July was an attack on the friendship between India and
Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai’s presence today conveys a befitting response to
that attack. The leaders expressed their determination to fight terrorism unitedly and
with all the forces at their command.
Prime Minister Dr. Singh conveyed to President Karzai that all of India’s
commitments to Afghanistan would be fully met.
India’s efforts for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan are also part of
a larger international endeavour to help the Afghan people in forging a pluralistic and
democratic society. It was agreed that a meeting of the Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Bureau would be hosted by India next year.
New Delhi
August 04, 20085
5 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530514119, (accessed on November 07, 2011, at 21:18)
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Annexure – VI
Joint Statement on the visit of President Hamid Karzai
January 12, 2009
President Karzai’s visit to India is symbolic, to express Afghanistan’s solidarity with
the Government and people of India in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attack. The
deplorable incident shows that terrorism is a threat to the entire humanity.
The leaders called for the full compliance with bilateral, multilateral and international
obligations of States to prevent terrorism in any manner originating from territories
under their control since terrorism emanates from the sanctuaries and training camps
and the sustenance and support received by the terrorist groups.
Prime Minister Dr. Singh conveyed to President Karzai that, following the completion
of the road from Zaranj to Delaram in South-western Afghanistan, a second major
infrastructure project, the Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul transmission line and the sub-station
at Chimtala in Northern Afghanistan, will be handed over shortly to the Government
of Afghanistan.
Prime Minister Dr. Singh further conveyed that in order to help the fraternal people of
Afghanistan in tiding over their current food crisis, India will gift Afghanistan
250,000 metric tonnes of wheat. The shipment will be effected immediately, as soon
as the Government of Afghanistan has worked out its transportation arrangements.
The two leaders reaffirmed the special relationship between India and Afghanistan, to
build a strong, united, and prosperous Afghanistan and to work towards peace,
stability and development of the entire region.
New Delhi
January 12, 20096
6 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530514629, (accessed on November 07, 2011, at 22:17)
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Annexure – VII
Visit of Foreign Minister Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta of Afghanistan
July 28, 2009
During the visit, the Afghan Foreign Minister called on Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh and had meetings with the Minister of External Affairs and the
National Security Advisor Mr. Narayanan on a range of bilateral, regional, and global
issues of mutual interest.
The Afghan Foreign Minister conveyed Afghanistan’s deep appreciation for India’s
friendship, generous contribution and vital role in the processes of stabilisation,
reconstruction and national development of Afghanistan.
The two Ministers reaffirmed the abiding determination of the two governments to
work for making South Asia an abode of peace, prosperity, moderation and
cooperation. They highlighted terrorism as the most important security threat facing
the region and reiterated their full resolve to combat it.
The Ministers decided to establish an India-Afghanistan Partnership Council
composed of separate groups on political consultation, capacity development &
education, power & water, culture, trade & industry, health, and agriculture. This will
harness greater institutional support for the implementation of ongoing programmes
and enlarge development cooperation between the two countries.
New Delhi
July 28, 20097
7 Ministry of External Affairs, The republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530515068, (accessed on November 07, 2011, at 22:10)
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Annexure – VIII
India-Afghanistan Joint Statement during the visit of President Mr. Hamid
Karzai
April 26, 2010
During the discussions between President Karzai and Prime Minister Singh the two
sides noted that these relations were rooted in historical and civilisation links, and
served not only the interests and welfare of the two countries, but also contributed to
peace, stability and prosperity in the region.
Prime Minister Singh stated that India desired to see a strong, stable and prosperous
Afghanistan, at peace. India remained committed to assisting Afghanistan in its
development efforts in accordance with the wishes and priorities of the people of
Afghanistan. India’s development partnership is focussed on areas of infrastructure
development, human resource development and capacity building, food assistance and
small development projects that bring immediate benefit to the people at the grass-
roots level.
The two leaders reiterated their conviction that the national rebuilding process in
Afghanistan should be led by the people of Afghanistan in keeping with the principles
of national sovereignty, independence and non-interference in internal affairs. They
expressed their grave concern over the threat posed by terrorism to Afghanistan’s
national development efforts. They expressed their determination to work with the
international community to combat the forces of terrorism which pose a particular
threat to the region.
President Karzai conveyed his outrage and deep condolences over the terrorist attacks
on Indian nationals in Afghanistan, and assured the Indian side that the Government
of Afghanistan is committed to providing full security to them. The Indian side
welcomed these assurances.
New Delhi
April 26, 20108
8 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530515751, (accessed on November 07, 2011, at 18:44)
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Annexure – IX
Joint Statement during the visit of President of Afghanistan
February 03, 2011
The Indian side reiterated its long term commitment to the reconstruction and
development of Afghanistan, and to the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan
under President Karzai’s leadership to build a strong, independent, democratic,
peaceful and prosperous nation. The two leaders agreed that the strategic partnership
between India and Afghanistan is a positive factor for peace and stability in the
region. In this context, the two leaders also discussed the common threat faced by
both their societies from terrorism. They agreed that this ran counter to the aspiration
of their peoples.
President Karzai expressed gratitude of the Afghan people for the assistance provided
by India over the years. He underlined the need for the two countries to work together
in close cooperation in the interest of the people of the two countries and stability in
the region at large.
Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh accepted an invitation from President Karzai to
visit Afghanistan at an early date.
New Delhi
February 3, 20119
9 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530517136, (accessed on November 07, 2011, at 16:37)
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Annexure – X
Text of Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
October 04, 2011
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India, hereinafter referred to
as "the Sides",
RECOGNISING the time-tested and friendly relationship between the two countries,
underpinned by historical and cultural ties;
EMPHASISING the fundamental and lasting importance of the Treaty of Friendship
between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Afghanistan of 4
January 1950, and subsequent Agreements and Joint Statements;
PROCEEDING from a desire to further strengthen their traditional and historical ties
to mutual benefit;
DRAWING upon their rich and fruitful tradition of cooperation in various fields since
the establishment of their diplomatic relations;
CONVINCED that the further comprehensive development of their bilateral ties
would promote progress and prosperity in both states and the region as a whole;
APPRECIATING the significant expansion of bilateral ties between the two countries
and, in this context, the sincere and generous assistance that the Republic of India has
provided to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan over the past ten years;
SEEKING to impart a long term commitment to their multifaceted bilateral relations
and to actively develop them in political, development, economic, trade, scientific,
technological, cultural and other fields in the years ahead;
CONFIRMING their adherence to the common ideals of peace, democracy, rule of
law, non-violence, human rights and fundamental freedoms;
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REAFFIRMING their commitment to international law, including to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations Charter;
Hereby proclaim the establishment of relations of Strategic Partnership, as laid out in
the following paragraphs including GENERAL PRINCIPLES, POLITICAL &
SECURITY COOPERATION, TRADE & ECONOMIC COOPERATION,
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, CIVIL
SOCIETY & PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONS.
IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM
This Strategic Partnership would be implemented under the framework of a
Partnership Council, which will be headed by the Foreign Ministers of both countries.
The Council will convene annual meetings.
The Council will consist of separate Joint Working Groups on Political & Security
Consultations, Trade and Economic Cooperation, Capacity Development &
Education, and Social, Cultural and Civil Society, involving high level representatives
from concerned Ministries/Authorities.
The existing dialogue mechanisms between the two sides will become part of the
Council.10
10 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530518343, (accessed on June 06, 2012, at 22:48)
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Annexure – XI
Brief notes on two MOUs signed during visit of President of Afghanistan
October 04, 2011
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Development of
Hydrocarbons
The bilateral MoU signed between the Indian Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas
and Afghan Ministry of Mines, establishes a cooperative institutional framework to
facilitate and enhance, bilateral cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector, including oil
and gas. It envisages cooperation in the areas of exploration, production,
infrastructure, research & training and promotion of private and public sector
investment in development of hydrocarbons including oil and natural gas.
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Mineral Resources
Development
The bilateral MoU signed between the Indian and Afghan Ministry of Mines aims at
promotion of private and public sector investment in mining and mining-related
activities; mineral exploration & exploitation and capacity building in the field of
geosciences and mining in Afghanistan.
New Delhi
October 4, 201111
11 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530518345, (accessed on June 06, 2012, at 22:32)
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Annexure – XII
Joint Statement by India and Afghanistan on the Visit of Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Afghanistan to India
May 01, 2012
At the invitation of Shri S.M. Krishna, External Affairs Minister, H.E. Dr. Zalmai
Rassoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is
currently on a visit to India. The Ministers co-chaired the inaugural session of the
India-Afghanistan Partnership Council which has been mandated to implement the
Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by the Prime Minister and the President of
Afghanistan in October 2011. The meeting of the Partnership Council was preceded
by a meeting of the Joint Working Group on Political and Security Consultations
headed by Foreign Secretary and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan.
The Prime Minister welcomed the holding of the first session of the India-
Afghanistan Partnership Council and expressed the hope that the strategic partnership
between India and Afghanistan would be further strengthened in the critical period
ahead.
The two Ministers welcomed the holding of the first meeting of the Joint Working
Group on Political and Security Consultations and decided that the three Joint
Working Groups on Trade and Economic Cooperation, Capacity Development and
Education, and Social, Cultural, Civil Society and people to people contacts will meet
at an early date. The Foreign Minister of Afghanistan welcomed India’s initiative to
host a Regional Investors’ Meeting in New Delhi to facilitate investments in
Afghanistan.
New Delhi
May 1, 201212
12 Ministry of External Affairs, The Republic of India, accessible at:
http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530519270, (accessed on August 08, 2012, at 16:56)
